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Beyond “Life and Liberty”:
The Evolving Right to Counsel
John D. King*
The majority of Americans, if they have contact with the criminal justice
system at all, will experience it through misdemeanor courtrooms. More than
ever before, the criminal justice system is used to sort, justify, and reify a separate underclass. And as the system of misdemeanor adjudication continues to be
flooded with new cases, the value that is exalted over all others is efficiency.
The result is a system that can make it virtually painless to plead guilty (which
has always been true for low-level offenses), but that is now overlaid with a new
system of increasingly harsh collateral consequences. The hidden consequences
of a conviction may never be explained to the person choosing to plead guilty,
leading to unjust results that happen more regularly and with more severe consequences than ever before.
This Article argues that current Sixth Amendment jurisprudence on the
right to counsel has not adequately adapted to the changed realities within
which misdemeanor prosecutions take place today. Because of the dramatic
changes in the cultural meaning and real-life consequences of low-level convictions, there is no longer a useful or constitutionally significant line between
those cases resulting in actual imprisonment and those cases not resulting in
imprisonment. Three years ago in Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court recognized that the line between the direct and collateral consequences of a conviction has no constitutional significance in defining the effective assistance of
counsel. Recognizing that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has evolved
throughout its history to accommodate the changing cultural context of criminal
prosecutions, this Article calls for a robust expansion of the right to counsel in
all criminal cases.
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INTRODUCTION
Millions of people cycle through American criminal courts each year,
the vast majority of them in low-level misdemeanor courts. Although it has
always been true that more people are prosecuted for petty offenses than for
serious criminal misconduct, the world of criminal justice has changed in
two important respects in the last thirty years. First, the advent and spread of
zero-tolerance policing and prosecution has drawn a far higher percentage of
people into the criminal justice system.1 Second, the scope, severity, and
ubiquity of the collateral consequences2 of a misdemeanor conviction have
dramatically increased. The contours of the federal constitutional right to
counsel in a criminal case, however, have remained frozen in time over the
same period. Because the seriousness of a case — for the purpose of determining who does and does not have a right to appointed counsel — continues to be defined solely by the fact of incarceration, courts are only required
to appoint counsel in misdemeanor cases if the defendant is actually sentenced to a period of incarceration.3 Problematic at its inception, this crude
and arbitrary dichotomy between “petty” and “serious” makes less and less
sense as the world of criminal justice continues to evolve in the direction of
mass processing and externally imposed collateral consequences.4
1
As described in Part II.A, infra, police forces and officers have embraced a model of
policing that moves away from the exercise of discretion in deciding whom to arrest, and
legislatures have systematically taken away the ability of judges and, in some cases, prosecutors to exercise discretion.
2
As more fully explained in Part II.C, infra, collateral consequences are all those civil
restrictions that flow from a criminal conviction, including limitations on employment, custodial rights, and immigration consequences.
3
See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 383–84 (1979). Courts may neither impose a sentence involving incarceration nor suspend such a sentence without offering the indigent defendant the assistance of court-appointed counsel. See infra Part I.C.
4
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 105 (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2010826 (“[M]isdemeanor processing reveals the deep
structure of the criminal system: as a pyramid that functions relatively transparently and according to legal principle at the top, but in an opaque and unprincipled way for the vast majority of cases at the bottom.”).
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Addressing some of these changed circumstances, in 2010, the Supreme
Court held that when a person is charged with a crime that carries the potential consequence of deportation, her lawyer has an affirmative duty to give
correct advice about that consequence.5 In that case, Padilla v. Kentucky,
the defendant was charged with a felony, transporting a large amount of
marijuana in his tractor-trailer, and was therefore entitled to counsel as a
matter of federal constitutional law. If Mr. Padilla had been charged with
simple possession of marijuana, however, his right to counsel under the
United States Constitution would have been contingent upon whether or not
the judge intended to sentence him to jail.6 For the many people accused of
drug-related misdemeanors for which incarceration is not imposed, current
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence provides no right to court-appointed counsel. But the prospect of deportation and other life-altering consequences of
such a conviction are no less real and not necessarily any less certain than in
the felony context.7 The Supreme Court has expanded the right to the effective assistance of counsel to a point where it is logically incoherent to deny
vulnerable misdemeanor defendants the right to court-appointed counsel at
all.
The classic account of misdemeanor process, Malcolm Feeley’s The
Process is the Punishment, describes a system focused on the sorting of
defendants into two groups, not on the basis of guilt or innocence, but rather
on their willingness to pay the “process costs” of an overburdened system.8
The same dynamic governs low-level courtrooms today: a savvy overworked
misdemeanor prosecutor can efficiently resolve many cases at an early stage
by offering a non-incarcerative sentence.9 Faced with the choice between
5
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (2010). This is true, the Court held, at least
where the potential consequence of deportation is “truly clear.” See id.
6
See Scott, 440 U.S. at 383–84. Of course, Mr. Padilla may have had a statutory right to
counsel under Kentucky law. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.100(4)(b) (2012) (granting a
right to counsel to those charged with “[a] misdemeanor or offense any penalty for which
includes the possibility of confinement”). See generally infra notes 238–43 and accompanying text for discussion of states exceeding the federal constitutional floor.
7
“Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of . . . any
law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled
substance . . . other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams
or less of marijuana, is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2011). The only instance in
which a drug-related conviction would not render a noncitizen deportable, therefore, is for
possession of a very small amount of marijuana.
8
See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING
CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979). Feeley discusses the concept of “process costs”
specifically at pages 290–92.
9
See M. Chris Fabricant, Rethinking Criminal Defense Clinics in ‘Zero-Tolerance’ Policing Regimes, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 20–21),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1921445. One scholar-practitioner describing a contemporary high-level misdemeanor system wrote that Feeley’s book
“capture[d] what may be the most essential truth about the lower criminal court — so long as
the cost of proceeding is greater than the ultimate sanction, most cases will never be litigated.”
Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1157, 1177 (2004).
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leaving court with a small fine and a conviction, and facing a trial weeks or
months in the future with the possibility of six months of incarceration, most
people would quickly take the non-jail alternative and consider the matter
closed. That alternative can be accomplished without the state ever having
to pay for a lawyer for the defendant.
Many jurisdictions provide, either formally or informally, for some
kind of deferred adjudication or diversionary program for those accused of
minor offenses.10 Where such programs carry no possibility of incarceration,
the accused is not entitled by federal constitutional doctrine to the appointment of counsel.11 And nobody, therefore, bears the responsibility of explaining any consequence to the defendant that is external to the criminal
justice system, no matter how long-lasting or life-altering. When the judge
presents the unrepresented accused with the option of pleading guilty and
being placed in a first offender program, or accepting a sentence consisting
only of a fine, it would seem an irrational move to decline the offer.12 This is
how many hundreds of thousands of minor offenses are resolved every
year.13 Because the longer-term consequences to the defendants are largely
external to the criminal justice system, however, they remain invisible to that
system. The uncounseled defendant who chooses a quick, short-term resolution that does not involve incarceration might later be deported, evicted,
have her children removed, or suffer any number of other consequences that
do not constitute a “direct” consequence of the criminal conviction.14
Current Sixth Amendment jurisprudence on the right to counsel allows
for the “waiving” of incarceration by prosecutors or judges, and the structure and incentives of the criminal justice system can even encourage such a
move, thereby removing from the defendant her right to appointed counsel.
A common practice in some misdemeanor courtrooms is for the judge to ask
the prosecutor at the initial hearing whether or not counsel needs to be appointed.15 Should the prosecutor advise the judge that the government will
not be seeking incarceration, the judge will not appoint counsel for the de10

See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part I.C.
12
Accepting a quick guilty plea and entry into a “first offender” program not only eliminates the need for the accused to return to court for subsequent hearings, it allows the accused
to control her own destiny; most such programs allow for the dismissal of minor charges upon
successful completion of the program’s requirements. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-251
(2011). Of course, no institutional actor has any incentive to discourage the accused from
entering into such a program or to explain the odds of successfully completing such a program.
13
Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 698 (2002) (“More than ninety percent of dispositions on the merits of criminal prosecutions are convictions, and more than
ninety percent of convictions result from guilty pleas.”).
14
See infra Part II.C.
15
See, e.g., John D. King, Procedural Justice, Collateral Consequences, and the Adjudication of Misdemeanors, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Erik Luna &
Marianne Wade eds., forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 8), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1953880; Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining
Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 311 (2011).
11
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fendant. Although it may seem somewhat perverse to allow the prosecutor
to decide which defendants do and do not have a right to appointed counsel,
the practice described above is perfectly consistent with current federal constitutional doctrine on the right to appointed counsel.16 Despite the “collateral” threats of deportation, eviction, and other longer-term consequences,
the indigent defendant facing a misdemeanor is only entitled to “the guiding
hand of counsel”17 if the trial judge believes it necessary.18
Of course, our system has long recognized that criminal convictions
obtained without presence of defense counsel are less reliable.19 Without
counsel, the defendant forfeits the ability to challenge meaningfully myriad
issues, and the system receives none of the benefits of a truly adversarial
challenge.20 Was there a constitutional violation in the police actions? Is the
defendant competent to stand trial? Was the defendant factually guilty of the
charged crime? Was the defendant legally guilty of the charged crime?21
The system of adjudicating low-level crimes has historically tolerated this
lack of precision and accuracy because the offenses involved are “petty”
and the consequences are not serious.22 To the extent that this distinction
made any logical sense when it was created, it does not anymore. The rationale no longer fits the reality.
As the Supreme Court suggested in Padilla, the demarcation between
the “direct” and “collateral” consequences of a conviction is not as clear or
as meaningful as previous precedent has pretended them to be.23 The logic
of Padilla presents a challenge to the Court’s prior jurisprudence, which divides cases neatly into “petty” and “serious” cases for purposes of determining whether the Sixth Amendment requires the appointment of counsel.
Rereading the Court’s decisions on the right to counsel against a backdrop of
the actual practice of contemporary adjudication and the potential consequences of even a low-level conviction requires a rethinking of the scope of
the right to counsel.24 As it has several times in the past century,25 the Court
16

See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 47, 69 (1932); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.2 n.9 (3d ed. 2000).
18
See Scott, 440 U.S. at 383–84 (Brennan, J., dissenting); infra Part I.D.
19
See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 667 (2002).
20
See Francis D. Doucette, Non-Appointment of Counsel in Indigent Criminal Cases: A
Case Study, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 495, 496–99 (1997) (describing the processing of a typical
case involving possession of marijuana in a Massachusetts district court and listing each of the
potential factual and legal issues in the case that remained unexplored).
21
For a discussion of the expressive differences of the concepts of “actual innocence” and
“legal innocence” and an argument against a binary understanding of the two concepts, see
generally Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (2011).
22
See Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 6, 61
(1964); FEELEY, supra note 8, at 5–14.
23
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).
24
Others have called for the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel to adapt to modern realities in other ways, including a recognition of the increased use of plea bargaining and cooperation. See, e.g., Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel
Doctrine, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1637 (2003) (arguing that courts should expand the under17

R
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should acknowledge the new reality with regard to the collateral consequences of a conviction and allow the right to counsel to continue to evolve.
Part I of this Article describes the historical development of the federal
constitutional right to appointed counsel and the freezing of the development
of that doctrine in 1979 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Scott v. Illinois.26 Part II explains the changed context within which criminal cases are
adjudicated today, exploring the dramatic increase in the scope, severity, and
ubiquity of collateral consequences of a minor criminal conviction. Part III
analyzes the application of the current doctrine to the modern context of
criminal adjudication and the collateral consequences faced by criminal defendants. Part III then argues that the Scott Court’s adoption of the single
factor of actual incarceration as the sine qua non of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel should be abandoned in favor of a bright-line rule entitling
any indigent defendant accused of a criminal offense to a court-appointed
attorney. Because the right to counsel is the “master key” to all of the other
rights-protecting and reliability-ensuring rules of criminal procedure,27 it
should evolve to meet the realities of today’s world and be made available to
any indigent facing criminal charges.
I. THE HISTORY

OF THE

SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT

TO

COUNSEL

The guarantee that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence”28 has,
from its beginning, evolved to meet the demands of a changing criminal
justice system. Indeed, Chief Justice Warren Burger recognized that “[t]he
right to counsel has historically been an evolving concept.”29 Just as the
Framers of the Sixth Amendment rejected the traditional English proscription against lawyers for serious offenses,30 subsequent interpreters of the
Sixth Amendment have found a right to counsel much broader than that
foreseen by the Framers, and one more consonant with the values of a
changing cultural context.
A. English Common Law and the Framers
The English common law right to counsel evolved in reaction to the
types and volume of crimes being prosecuted, as well as the manner in
standing of what is a “critical stage” of a criminal prosecution to encompass events like plea
bargaining, snitching, and assisting with preparation of the presentence report).
25
See infra Parts I.B, I.C.
26
440 U.S. 367 (1979).
27
Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 7 (1962). Without a lawyer, “it is quite unlikely that an accused will be able to enjoy the
advantages of the other enumerated rights.” JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 128 (2002).
28
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
29
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
30
See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 27, at 6–21.

R
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which those prosecutions were carried out.31 Far from providing any guarantee of access to counsel, English common law actually forbade the use of a
lawyer for those charged with serious crimes until the mid-eighteenth century.32 Those charged with less serious crimes (generally, those not punishable by death) were entitled to retain counsel, but no right to the assistance of
counsel existed beyond the right to retain one’s own counsel at personal expense.33 The prohibition on defense counsel in serious cases was defended
as necessary to the maintenance of order and social peace, because the risks
of acquittal would be too great if the defendant charged with a serious crime
were entitled to counsel.34 As James Tomkovicz has argued, “[t]he assistance of counsel was seen as an impediment to efficient and successful prosecution and punishment.”35 The costs of actually providing counsel for a
broad group of defendants, of course, are twofold: First, society must bear
the financial cost of paying those lawyers. And second, the additional lawyers can be seen as imposing a cost on society by making the job of the
police and prosecution more difficult.
The English common-law prohibition on participation by defense counsel in serious cases gradually eroded alongside the rise of the professional
prosecutor and police force. Throughout the eighteenth century, as the English government grew stronger, the state began to focus more on threats to
the public order caused by “ordinary felons.”36 As more and more of these
prosecutions were carried out by a state-sanctioned prosecutor, as opposed to
a private party, courts became increasingly willing to allow retained defense
counsel to participate.37
At the time of the drafting and ratification of the Sixth Amendment,
England still only guaranteed the right to retain counsel to defendants
charged with misdemeanors, and even then only at their own expense.38 The
drafters of the Bill of Rights rejected this limitation to misdemeanors and
included a right to counsel in the Sixth Amendment.39 Indeed, even prior to
the ratification of the Sixth Amendment, American colonies had been much
31

Id. at 2–9.
Id. at 2–4; see also Metzger, supra note 24, at 1637–38; Emily Garcia Uhrig, A Case for
a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 541, 545–46 (2009).
33
TOMKOVICZ, supra note 27, at 2–4.
34
Id. (citing FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 10 (1951)).
35
Id. at 4. Similarly, one commentator has observed of the modern criminal justice system that “the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel conflicts with society’s need for effective law enforcement.” Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an
Endangered Right, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 62 (1991).
36
TOMKOVICZ, supra note 27, at 6–7.
37
See id. at 7.
38
See id. at 8. One additional (and very small) group of defendants was statutorily entitled to counsel: those impeached by the House of Commons for high treason. See id. Curiously, then, the right to counsel attached to those accused of the most minor and the most
serious crimes, but not those falling somewhere between the two.
39
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial . . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
32

R
R

R
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more liberal than English courts in their recognition of a right to counsel.40
It is generally understood, however, that the drafters did not intend to afford
those charged with crimes an affirmative right to counsel, but rather the right
to retain counsel at their own expense.41
B. The Beginnings of a Right to Court-Appointed Counsel
Just as the right to counsel had evolved over time in England, so has the
right evolved in the modern United States. In 1932, the Court decided Powell v. Alabama, in which nine African American men were charged with
rape, which at the time was a capital offense.42 The case proceeded to trial
quickly and without concern for fairness or accuracy. Six days after the
accusation was made, indictments were handed up and the defendants arraigned.43 Six days later, trial began and each of the unrepresented defendants was convicted and sentenced to death within a single day.44
Considering the trial proceedings, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions and found that the trial court had a “duty” to appoint counsel for the
defendants due to the specific circumstances of the case.45 In determining
that due process required the presence of counsel, the Court issued its famous statement about the importance of defense counsel to the reliability of
the process:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. . . . He requires the guiding hand of counsel
at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he

40
After describing the English common-law prohibition on counsel in serious cases, the
Powell Court put it in no uncertain terms: “The rule was rejected by the colonies.” Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932); see also Uhrig, supra note 32, at 547–48 (summarizing the
various rights to counsel provided by the colonies at the time immediately prior to the adoption
of the Sixth Amendment and describing the far more liberal approach than that set forth at
English common law).
41
See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979) (“There is considerable doubt that
the Sixth Amendment itself, as originally drafted by the Framers of the Bill of Rights, contemplated any guarantee other than the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution in a federal
court to employ a lawyer to assist in his defense.”); Garcia, supra note 35, at 41–42 (explaining that, at the time of enactment, the Sixth Amendment guarantee of right to counsel was a
right to be free to retain counsel of choice at one’s own expense).
42
Powell, 287 U.S. at 49–50.
43
Id. at 49.
44
Id. at 50–53. The trial court had appointed “all members of the bar” for purposes of
arraignment and trial. Id. at 49. When no lawyer appeared at trial for the defendants, the trial
court appointed an out-of-state lawyer who said that he had not prepared, was not familiar with
Alabama procedure, and had merely come down to Alabama “as a friend.” Id. at 55. The
Supreme Court found that such an appointment did not amount to a meaningful appointment of
counsel. See id. at 71.
45
Id.

R

R
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be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does
not know how to establish his innocence.46
Notwithstanding this soaring rhetoric, the Powell Court took great pains to
limit its holding to the facts before it. Read narrowly, Powell established
only that a state was constitutionally required to provide counsel to an indigent defendant in a capital case where such a defendant was “incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy or the like . . . .”47 The Powell Court left unanswered
questions about the scope of the right in cases less serious and in circumstances less compelling.
Although Powell’s fact-specific approach might have had the benefit of
flexibility, the doctrine failed to provide a workable doctrine for courts to
follow, and failed to provide protections for subsequent defendants. Only a
few years after Powell, the Court began to take a more categorical approach
to the right to counsel, at least as it applied to federal criminal prosecutions.
In Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court refused to apply a case-by-case analysis and
held instead that the federal government must provide counsel to any defendant facing criminal charges.48 The Court declined, however, to extend the
categorical rule established in Johnson to state criminal proceedings. In
Betts v. Brady, the Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not essential to a fair trial and was, therefore, not required by due
process in all state criminal prosecutions.49
In the three decades after Powell, the Court gradually moved from a
fact-specific and flexible approach to a categorical approach, eventually establishing the categorical right to court-appointed counsel in any serious
case in Gideon v. Wainwright.50 When he appeared for his trial on the felony
charge of breaking and entering, Clarence Gideon made history by telling
the judge that he wanted a lawyer and could not afford one. The trial judge
refused to appoint counsel, Gideon defended himself “about as well as could
be expected from a layman,” and the jury returned a guilty verdict.51 Gideon
was sentenced to a five-year period of incarceration.52 When his case
reached the Supreme Court, the Court concluded that the right to counsel

46

Id. at 68–69.
Id. at 71.
48
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (“The Sixth Amendment withholds from
federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his
life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.”).
49
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942). The case-by-case and fact-specific approach
that the Court embraced in Betts would be squarely rejected in Gideon v. Wainwright two
decades later. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (“The Court in Betts v.
Brady departed from the sound wisdom upon which the Court’s holding in Powell v. Alabama
rested. . . . Twenty-two States, as friends of the Court, argue that Betts was ‘an anachronism
when handed down’ and that it should now be overruled. We agree.”).
50
372 U.S. at 335.
51
Id. at 337.
52
Id.
47
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was a fundamental right and therefore incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause against the states.53 Although the Court
again left open the precise contours of the right, the Court held that it was an
“obvious truth”54 that fairness required that counsel be appointed for any
indigent defendant facing a serious criminal charge: “[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice,
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”55 Thus, in Gideon,
the Court rejected a balancing-test approach in favor of a categorical requirement of counsel, at least in felony cases.56
To demonstrate the proposition that the right to counsel was “fundamental and essential to a fair trial,”57 the Gideon Court pointed out that governments spend “vast sums of money to establish machinery to try
defendants accused of crime.”58 Why would governments do this, argued
the Court, unless the presence of a professional prosecutor was necessary for
the proper functioning of the legal system? And if the presence of the prosecutor was necessary, then so too was the presence of defense counsel.59 This
argument applies with perhaps even more force to low-level crimes for two
reasons. First, the capacious machinery that exists to process the multitudes
of low-level arrestees through misdemeanor courtrooms depends on a professional prosecutor to function smoothly and efficiently. Second, because
of the far greater volume in misdemeanor courtrooms, judges lack the ability
to ensure fairness and procedural regularity; prosecutors have relatively
greater control over the system of processing low-level crimes than over
serious crimes.60 Because of the diminished procedural protections and formal safeguards in misdemeanor courtrooms, the prosecutor takes on an even
more powerful role than in felony courtrooms; unchecked, this power can
obviously lead to a skewing of the process. Accordingly, just as the Court
explained in Gideon, the need for a professional prosecutor makes clear the
need for a defense attorney.

53

Id. at 353–45.
Id. at 344.
55
Id.
56
For an interesting discussion of the evolution in the Supreme Court’s constitutional
criminal procedure jurisprudence from a categorical approach to a balancing-test approach, see
Jeffrey L. Fisher, Categorical Requirements in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 94 GEO.
L.J. 1493, 1500–01 (2006).
57
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342.
58
Id. at 344.
59
Id. (“That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money
hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in
criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”).
60
See infra Part II.B.
54
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C. Contours and Limits of the Contemporary Right to Counsel
As states adapted to the newly defined constitutional right to courtappointed counsel, state courts and legislatures came to different conclusions
regarding whether the right was limited to felonies, serious crimes (defined
in some other way), cases involving the potential for incarceration, cases
involving actual incarceration, or all criminal cases.61
Although the cases in which the Court construed the right to counsel —
from Powell through Gideon — each involved felony charges, there is no
limiting language in the opinions that would restrict the rationales and the
holdings to felony cases. In fact, the language the Court uses in those decisions is striking in its breadth, referring to lawyers as “necessities, not luxuries”62 and the right to counsel as an “essential barrier[] against arbitrary or
unjust deprivation of human rights.”63 Later cases, however, refined and
restricted the right to appointed counsel in nonfelony prosecutions.64
The Court took its next step toward resolving the scope of the right in
1972, when it decided Argersinger v. Hamlin.65 In Argersinger, the defendant had been charged with carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor
carrying a potential penalty of six months incarceration and a $1,000 fine.66
The accused requested that the court appoint him counsel because of his
inability to pay, and the trial court refused this request.67 After a bench trial,
the judge found him guilty and sentenced him to a ninety-day period of
incarceration.68 In addressing Argersinger’s claim that he was deprived of
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Supreme Court agreed and for the
first time explicitly expanded the Gideon rule beyond the felony arena.69
The Court explained that in almost every other context, the guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment apply to all criminal cases without regard to the seriousness of the particular offense charged.70 Listing various protections con-

61
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27 n.1 (1972) (citing Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103 (1970))
(describing the post-Gideon landscape in which thirty-one states had extended the holding of
Gideon to cover nonfelonies, in some cases including even traffic offenses, but in others only
involving “serious misdemeanors”).
62
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
63
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
64
See generally Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 25. In
every felony prosecution, regardless of whether or not the defendant is sentenced to incarceration, the state must provide counsel to an indigent defendant. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549
U.S. 406, 419 (2007).
65
407 U.S. at 25.
66
Id. at 26.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 36–40.
70
Id. at 27–29. The Argersinger Court explained in some detail why the right to trial by
jury stands on a different footing than the other rights found within the Sixth Amendment,
making clear that “the right to trial by jury has a different genealogy and is brigaded with a
system of trial to a judge alone.” Id. at 29.
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tained within the Sixth Amendment, the Court explained that “[w]e have
never limited these rights to felonies or to lesser but serious offenses.”71 The
rhetoric of the Court went further, arguing that both history and logic compelled a broad reading of the right to counsel, even in cases less serious than
felonies.72 The Sixth Amendment, the Court explained, had embodied a
clear rejection by the colonies of the British common law’s restrictions on
allowing counsel in criminal cases.73 The Court went on to argue that just as
counsel was a necessary ingredient for a fair trial in a serious case, so too
was the presence of counsel necessary for a fair trial in a case like that
before it:
The requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair trial
even in a petty-offense prosecution. We are by no means convinced that legal and constitutional questions involved in a case
that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period are any
less complex than when a person can be sent off for six months or
more.74
Notwithstanding the broad rhetoric of the majority opinion, the Argersinger
Court stopped short of declaring a right to appointed counsel in all criminal
cases. Instead, the Court created a bright-line rule that no person may be
incarcerated in a criminal case unless that person was either represented by
counsel at trial or had validly waived the right to counsel.75
The Argersinger Court thus rejected the more flexible approach urged
by Justice Powell.76 Concurring in the result, Justice Powell criticized the
majority approach as overly rigid and both under- and over-inclusive in
scope. Justice Powell would have adopted a three-factor test in determining
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the
appointment of counsel for an indigent accused in a misdemeanor case: the
complexity of the charged offense, the probable sentence if the accused were
to be convicted, and any other case-specific factual circumstances.77 In elaborating on the second factor, Justice Powell argued that imprisonment should
not be the only consequence to be considered; rather, courts should take a
broader view of the consequence of a conviction in deciding whether due
process required the appointment of counsel.78 “The consequences of a mis71

Id. at 28.
Id. at 32–37.
73
Id. at 30 (“The Sixth Amendment thus extended the right to counsel beyond its common-law dimensions.”); see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932).
74
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 33. The reference to crimes punishable by imprisonment of
six months or more is a reference to the separate constitutional guarantee of trial by jury,
which applies only to “serious offenses” as defined by the potential maximum period of incarceration, rather than the fact of actual incarceration. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
159–62 (1968).
75
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40.
76
Id. at 47–48 (Powell, J., concurring).
77
Id. at 64.
78
Id. at 47–48.
72
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demeanor conviction,” Justice Powell continued, “whether they be a brief
period served under the sometimes deplorable conditions found in local jails
or the effect of a criminal record on employability, are frequently of sufficient magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the label ‘petty.’” 79 One of
Justice Powell’s main criticisms of the majority opinion was that it was not
sufficiently protective of a defendant’s due process rights in cases that did
not result in imprisonment. “Serious consequences,” he wrote, “also may
result from convictions not punishable by imprisonment.”80 To be sure, Justice Powell was not advocating for a blanket right to counsel in all criminal
cases, which he described as appealing in its simplicity but overbroad and
unnecessary.81 His opinion in Argersinger, however, although opaque in
terms of limiting principles, is prescient for its focus on the potential impact
of the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction and for its argument
that courts should account for these consequences in evaluating “seriousness” in the context of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
After Argersinger, many thought it was only a matter of time before the
Court explicitly declared a right to appointed counsel in all criminal cases.82
In 1979, however, the Court put a stop to the development of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in Scott v. Illinois.83 Charged with misdemeanor theft, Scott faced a potential penalty of one year imprisonment, a
$500 fine, or both.84 The judge denied Scott’s request for court-appointed
counsel and, after a brief bench trial, found him guilty as charged and imposed a sentence consisting of a $50 fine and no incarceration.85 The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that counsel need only be
appointed in “serious cases,” which the Court defined as those cases that
resulted in actual incarceration.86 In so holding, the Court characterized incarceration as a uniquely severe sanction.87
Interestingly, the majority opinion in Scott was authored by then-Justice
Rehnquist, who had joined Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in
Argersinger. Unlike their concurring opinion in Argersinger, however, the
majority opinion in Scott was devoid of any analysis of the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, focusing instead on actual imprisonment as
the sole determinant of whether due process requires the appointment of
79

Id. at 47–48 (emphasis added).
Id. at 48; see also id. at 48 n.11 (listing such collateral consequences as social stigma,
loss of a driver’s license, forfeiture of public office, disqualification from a licensed profession,
and loss of pension rights).
81
See id. at 50–52.
82
See generally Alan K. Austin, The Pre-Trial Right to Counsel, 26 STAN. L. REV. 399
(1974); John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary
Pleas but Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88 (1977); Note, Right to Counsel Where
Imprisonment is Possible, 93 HARV. L. REV. 82 (1979).
83
440 U.S. 367 (1979).
84
Id. at 368.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 373–74.
87
Id. at 373.
80
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counsel. “Even were the matter res nova,” wrote Justice Rehnquist, “we
believe that the central premise of Argersinger — that actual imprisonment
is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment
— is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the
line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.”88 Justice
Powell concurred separately again, arguing for the adoption of a more flexible due process analysis like the one he endorsed in Argersinger.89
In limiting the right to counsel to cases involving actual imprisonment,
the Scott Court looked to the language of its recent cases interpreting the
Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel and its application in state criminal
cases. Focusing on the language from Argersinger that “no person may be
imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial,”90 the Court ignored a rich history of precedent explaining the function of the right to counsel and its importance in the fundamental fairness of the criminal justice
system. It may certainly be true that the drafters of the Sixth Amendment
had no intention of providing any right to counsel beyond the right of an
accused to hire her own counsel.91 Since Powell, however, courts had increasingly described the actual presence of counsel (and not merely the right
to be free from interference with one’s choice of counsel) as a fundamental
and necessary component of a reliable and fair trial.92 Scott also failed to
address the argument advanced in Argersinger that the legal and constitutional questions involved in many petty offenses are no less serious than
those presented in felony prosecutions. Despite these developments that re88

Id.
Id. at 374–75 (Powell, J., concurring).
90
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (emphasis added), quoted in Scott, 440
U.S. at 369.
91
WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 27–30 (1955),
cited in Scott, 440 U.S. at 370.
92
For example, see Gideon v. Wainwright:
89

[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an
obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums
of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. . . . That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers
to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but
it is in ours.
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (deciding that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was of a “fundamental character” embraced within the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Foremost among the variety of procedural
safeguards that accompany a criminal prosecution, the right to counsel has in recent times been
recognized as essential to establishing a fundamentally fair system of criminal adjudication.
See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168 (1985) (referring to the right to the assistance of
counsel as “indispensable to the fair administration of our adversarial system of criminal
justice”).
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inforced the importance of a broader right to counsel, the decision in Scott93
essentially froze the evolution of the right to appointed counsel.94
D. Shortcomings of the Current Doctrine
Scott presents serious logistical as well as conceptual problems. The
Scott doctrine requires judges to decide in advance of trial whether or not
they might send the accused to jail. Like the Queen of Hearts in Alice in
Wonderland,95 judges in low-level cases are invited to decide in some respect
the sentence before the trial. The Court also left open many procedural
questions: When exactly does the judge make the determination about incarceration? At arraignment? How does the judge make this determination?
Does she take evidence on the question? Consult with the prosecutor? Or
does the prosecutor decide alone, essentially certifying which cases are serious enough to warrant incarceration and therefore counsel? Can the right to
counsel come and go as the facts of the case become clear?
The primary shortcoming with Scott, however, and the main scholarly
criticism of the decision, has always been conceptual — if due process and
fundamental fairness require counsel in serious cases, how could it be otherwise in petty cases?96 With rare exception,97 the rules of evidence and proce-

93
Four members of the Scott Court dissented but did not all agree on an alternative doctrine. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 375–89 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 389–90 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun did not join in the main dissent in Scott, which argued that any
person charged with an offense that carried any authorized imprisonment had the right to
appointed counsel. Id. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting). While rejecting the majority’s focus on
“actual imprisonment,” Justice Blackmun would have held only that the right to appointed
counsel attached to any prosecution for an offense in which the accused is entitled to a trial by
jury (because the authorized punishment was at least six months of incarceration). Id. at
389–90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Because the defendant in Scott was entitled to a jury trial
but was denied appointed counsel, Justice Blackmun would have reversed his conviction. See
id. at 390.
94
There have been only two significant subsequent developments in the GideonArgersinger-Scott line of cases. In 1994, the Court approved the use of a valid uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction to enhance a subsequent sentence. United States v. Nichols, 511 U.S.
738, 748–49 (1994). In 2002, the Court made clear that a defendant cannot be sentenced to
any term of incarceration — even after having been initially sentenced to probation — unless
the underlying conviction was obtained either with the presence of counsel or after a valid
waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002).
95
See LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 187 (The MacMillan Co.
1921) (1865).
96
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 28 (1972); Garcia, supra note 35, at 54–55;
Lawrence Herman & Charles A. Thompson, Scott v. Illinois and the Right to Counsel: A
Decision in Search of a Doctrine?, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71, 71–72 (1979); John M. Junker,
The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV. 685, 705 (1968); Roberts,
supra note 15, at 290–313; Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.C. L. REV. 1, 29
(1992).
97
See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970) (holding that a defendant
charged with a “petty offense” for which the maximum penalty did not exceed six months of
incarceration was not entitled to a trial by jury).

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\48-1\HLC102.txt

16

unknown

Seq: 16

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

1-MAR-13

14:54

[Vol. 48

dure are the same, and the complexity of trials is not necessarily different.98
The point of this Article, however, is not to rehash the familiar criticisms of
Scott’s analysis. It is to argue that, even assuming Scott made sense when it
was decided, its analytical framework no longer stands up. Changed circumstances have eliminated the category of criminal convictions previously
characterized as “petty.”
The “actual incarceration” line drawn by the Court in Scott finds support neither in the history of the right to counsel nor in the logic of the
Court’s previous cases. Indeed, the Court had shown a willingness to consider the right to counsel more fundamental to the process than other procedural rights. The Court in Argersinger distinguished between the historical
right to counsel and the historical right to trial by jury: “While there is historical support for limiting the ‘deep commitment’ to trial by jury to ‘serious
criminal cases,’ there is no such support for a similar limitation on the right
to assistance of counsel.”99 The Court went on to examine the history of the
right to counsel, finding that the language of the Sixth Amendment “extended the right to counsel beyond its common-law dimensions. But there is
nothing in the language of the Amendment, its history, or in the decisions of
this Court, to indicate that it was intended to embody a retraction of the right
in petty offenses wherein the common law previously did require that counsel be provided.”100 Although the history did not support a right to courtappointed counsel for low-level offenses, neither did it support the drawing
of a line at the fact of actual imprisonment.
Just as history provided no support for the limitation settled on by the
Court in Scott, neither did the logic of the Court’s previous decisions. The
Argersinger Court recognized that “[t]he problems associated with misdemeanor and petty offenses often require the presence of counsel to insure the
accused a fair trial.”101 In neither Argersinger nor Scott, however, did the
Court embrace any logical or instrumental argument for a greater need for
counsel in more serious crimes. The Court in Argersinger even suggested
that the higher volume of cases that characterize the misdemeanor adjudication system may make the presence of counsel even more necessary in that
context because of the “obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the
fairness of the result.”102
Drawing the bright line at actual incarceration was not supported either
by history or by logic, but by expense. In Scott, the closely divided Court
read Argersinger as setting an outer (or lower) limit for the right to courtappointed counsel, and it explained that the actual imprisonment standard
had “proved reasonably workable, whereas any extension would create con98
See Roberts, supra note 15, at 292 (exploring the ways in which advocacy in low-level
cases can differ (or not) from advocacy in more serious cases).
99
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 30, quoted in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 379 n.6 (1979).
100
Id.
101
Id. at 36–37.
102
Id. at 34.
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fusion and impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on fifty
quite diverse states.”103 Contrary to the Court’s assertion, of course, the extension of the right to counsel in any criminal case would eliminate confusion regarding the scope of that right. It seems clear instead that the Court
was focused on the specter of increased costs in reaching its decision to limit
the right to counsel to those facing actual imprisonment.104 This resourcefocused approach differed dramatically from that of the Argersinger Court,
which addressed outright the argument that extension of the right to counsel
in low-level cases would be prohibitively expensive: a “partial solution” to
the concern about cost would be for states to decriminalize petty
misconduct.105
From the 1930s through the late 1970s, the Supreme Court gradually
staked out the contours of the federal constitutional right to counsel. This
half-century of cases developed the importance of counsel to the fairness,
accuracy, and legitimacy of a criminal conviction. The development of the
right to counsel stalled in 1979 with Scott v. Illinois. And in freezing the
right to counsel around the sole factor of actual incarceration, the Court
failed to honor a long tradition of flexible jurisprudence that allowed the
scope of the right to respond to changing institutional and social needs. The
Court further failed to justify in any satisfying way the creation of a bright
line between petty and serious offenses in this context. As a result, at the
very time that misdemeanor prosecutions were exploding in number and collateral consequences becoming far more widespread and severe, the right to
counsel was prevented from evolving to meet these changed circumstances.
II. THE CHANGED CONTEXT

OF

MISDEMEANOR PROSECUTIONS

A. Broken Windows
The end of the expansion of the right to counsel coincided almost exactly with the rise of the era of greatly expanded collateral consequences.106
In the 1980s, the “broken windows” theory of policing became ascendant
and quickly had an impact in both police departments and prosecutors’ offices across the country.107 Generally traced to a 1982 article in The Atlantic
103

Scott, 440 U.S. at 373.
In declining to extend the right to counsel to all criminal cases where imprisonment is
an authorized penalty, the Court provides the following rather opaque explanation: “Unfortunately, extensive empirical work has not been done. That which exists suggests that the requirements of Argersinger have not proved to be unduly burdensome. That some jurisdictions
have had difficulty implementing Argersinger is certainly not an argument for extending it.”
Id. at 373 n.5 (citations omitted).
105
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 38 n.9 (“One partial solution to the problem of minor offenses may well be to remove them from the court system. . . . Such a solution, of course, is
peculiarly within the province of state and local legislatures.”).
106
See infra Part II.B.
107
See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New
104
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by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling,108 the “broken windows” theory
posits that “at the community level, disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence.”109 If a single broken window is left unattended, they argue, others will follow; before long, informal
and traditional methods of maintaining social order begin to disappear and
the message is sent out that deviant or disorderly behavior will be tolerated.110 Although they stop short of arguing that social disorder of the kind
they describe inevitably leads to serious crime, Wilson and Kelling argue
that the kind of social breakdown that follows from a progression of petty
crime leaves a community “vulnerable to criminal invasion.”111 Although
the claims of the “broken windows” school of thought have been hotly contested and the consequences of such an approach to policing fiercely criticized,112 it has certainly led to a dramatic rise in the rate of low-level
prosecution. In the last few decades, the number of misdemeanor prosecutions has more than doubled, to a 2006 level of approximately 10.5
million.113
Wilson and Kelling’s main argument has nothing specifically to do with
the prosecution of crime but rather is focused on policing. Their argument,
rather than a call for greater prosecution of minor crimes, is primarily for a
return to the traditional role of police officers as enforcers of community
norms.114 They call for police strategy to retreat from its focus on crime
solving and instead for a return to the police officer as maintainer of peace
York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 292–93 (1998) [hereinafter Harcourt, Reflecting on the
Subject]. For an excellent history and analysis of the various strains of thought generally
comprising the “broken windows” school of thought, see generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT,
ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2001) [hereinafter
HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER].
108
See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
109
Id. at 29, 31.
110
See id.
111
Id.; see also Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject, supra note 107, at 292–95 (questioning the effectiveness of order-maintenance policing in New York City but stating that “New
York City’s new policing strategy has met with overwhelming support in the press and among
public officials, policymakers, sociologists, criminologists, and political scientists. The media
describe the ‘famous’ Broken Windows essay as ‘the bible of policing’ and ‘the blueprint for
community policing.’”); Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of
Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2488 (1997) (arguing that order-maintenance policing has
achieved “startlingly successful results” in New York City by strict police enforcement of
orderliness).
112
See, e.g., HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER, supra note 107, at 59–89; K. Babe Howell,
Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 281–82 (2009).
113
See ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR
COURTS 11 (2009); HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER, supra note 107, at 46–53; Roberts, supra
note 15, at 281 n.11–12.
114
Wilson & Kelling, supra note 108, at 29, 34 (“The essence of the police role in maintaining order is to reinforce the informal control mechanisms of the community itself. The
police cannot, without committing extraordinary resources, provide a substitute for that informal control.”).
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and order.115 Whatever the original intent of Wilson and Kelling, their ideas
have led to a change in the way petty misconduct is handled on American
streets and in American courts. In the three decades since their article was
published, “[b]roken windows policing has swept the American criminal
justice system at record speed.”116 And as the number of arrests has risen
since the early 1980s, so too has the number of criminal prosecutions for
petty crime.117
Of course, the majority of criminal prosecutions have always been for
misdemeanors. The majority of Americans, if they have contact with the
criminal justice system at all, will contact it through its misdemeanor courtrooms. The system of adjudicating misdemeanors affects far more people
than the system of adjudicating felonies.118 Consequently, the majority of
the approximately 65 million people in the United States with criminal
records have misdemeanor records.119 The more than 30% of Americans
who have been arrested for a criminal offense by the age of twenty-three are
predominantly arrested for misdemeanors.120 And of the new criminal cases

115
See HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER, supra note 107, at 24–25 (“The order-maintenance function focuses on integrating police officers into the community and teaching them to
maintain the peace and order rather than solve crimes. It is symbolized by the foot-patrol
officer on his beat, making his rounds, enforcing rules of civility, and maintaining good
order.”).
116
Id. at 23. “In 1993, New York City began implementing the quality-of-life initiative,
an order-maintenance policing strategy targeting minor misdemeanor offenses like turnstile
jumping, aggressive panhandling, and public drinking. . . . New York City’s new policing
strategy has met with overwhelming support in the press and among public officials, policymakers, sociologists, criminologists and political scientists.” Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject, supra note 107, at 292–93. See also HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER, supra note 107, at
23. Harcourt goes on to describe and differentiate the various and related philosophies, concepts, and practices that are sometimes grouped together under the “broken windows” umbrella: “[o]rder maintenance, broken windows, zero tolerance, community policing, social
norms, social meaning, [and] social influence . . . .” Id.
117
For a comparison of the numbers from before and after the policy came into effect, see
Howell, supra note 112, at 281–82 (comparing New York City’s 86,000 nonfelony arrests in
1989, prior to the introduction of the city’s strategy of Zero Tolerance Policing, with the
176,000 nonfelony arrests in 1998, after the strategy had been implemented).
118
Roberts, supra note 15, at 280–81.
119
See MICHELLE N. RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 27 n.2
(2011). Estimates of how many Americans have a criminal record are difficult to verify and
range from 65 million to 92 million. See Margaret Colgate Love, The Collateral Consequences of Padilla v. Kentucky: Is Forgiveness Now Constitutionally Required?, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 113, 118 nn.23–24 (2011), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/
essays/12-2011/Love.pdf. Roughly 2.3 million people live behind bars in the United States.
See Lauren E. Glaze, Correctional Population in the United States, 2010, in U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 3 tbl.1 (Ser. No. NCJ 236319, 2011), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus10.pdf.
120
See Erica Goode, Many in U.S. Are Arrested by Age 23, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
19, 2011, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/us/nearly-a-third-ofamericans-are-arrested-by-23-study-says.html?_r=0 (noting that the 30.2% of twenty-threeyear-olds who reported having been arrested for “an offense other than a minor traffic violation” was markedly higher than the 22% who made a similar report in a 1965 study).

R

R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\48-1\HLC102.txt

20

unknown

Seq: 20

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

1-MAR-13

14:54

[Vol. 48

each year, the vast majority are misdemeanors.121 The misdemeanor courtroom is, for most people, the American criminal justice system, but the subject has received relatively little scholarly attention.122 As has long been the
case, the adjudication of low-level offenses (and therefore, most offenses) is
driven largely by one factor: efficiency.123 There has always been a tension
between the formal procedural safeguards that are supposed to accompany
any criminal prosecution and the very different practice on the ground.124 As
the numbers have increased over the past few decades, the tension has increased: “broken windows” policing has led to more arrests, which has led
inexorably to more prosecutions, which has led in turn to larger caseloads on
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges. At the same time that changes in
policing philosophies and prosecution strategies have led to hugely increased
numbers and a demand for more efficient mass processing of cases, the actual (and externally imposed) effects of a criminal conviction have become
far more severe.
B. A View from the Ground Floor: How Misdemeanors are Processed
There has always been a tension between the formal procedural safeguards that are supposed to attend any criminal prosecution and the very
different practice on the ground. Of course, nowhere is this tension more
pronounced than in the adjudication of misdemeanors, which are processed
in huge and increasing numbers. The two “models of the criminal process”
described by Herbert Packer in 1964 continue to define the poles of criminal
adjudication.125 The due process model “presumes the fallibility of actors
and thus values formalized procedures and protections,”126 while the crime
control model “begins from a presumption of guilt and an overriding faith in
the administrative processes that precede the bringing of the formal charge

121
While nationwide misdemeanor statistics are not routinely kept, it is clear that they
greatly outnumber felonies. See Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment
in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1803 n.78 (2012) (comparing felony
convictions to misdemeanor convictions); Natapoff, supra note 4, at 108, 108 n.25 (citing
BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 113, at 11) (estimating 10.5 million misdemeanor prosecutions annually).
122
There are, of course, many wonderful exceptions to the general lack of scholarly interest in how low-level crimes are processed. See generally, e.g., FEELEY, supra note 8; Caleb
Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 604 (1956); Natapoff,
supra note 4; Roberts, supra note 15; Weinstein, supra note 9.
123
See Foote, supra note 122, at 644.
124
See generally King, supra note 15; see also Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization,
Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1155,
1155–56 (2005) (“The distinction between substance and procedure pervades academic thinking all the way down to the foundations . . . . In trial-level courthouses, however, the distinction fades, as the defendant trades his procedural rights for reductions in his substantive
liability.”).
125
Packer, supra note 22, at 6.
126
King, supra note 15, at 2.
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in court.”127 One need only spend a morning in a misdemeanor courtroom to
understand the differences between the two models and the greater expediency (if not accuracy, fairness, or justice) provided by the crime control
model. If every defendant charged with a misdemeanor were to insist meaningfully and fully on her rights — not only to counsel and a trial, but also to
the presumption of innocence, compulsory process, confrontation rights, and
all of the other formal procedural safeguards to which she is entitled — the
system of criminal prosecution would have to undergo enormous change in
response.
Descriptions of misdemeanor courtrooms bear this out. Historical and
contemporary accounts of how low-level crimes are actually adjudicated
support Justice Douglas’s 1972 characterization of the system as one of “assembly-line justice.”128 One of the best-known descriptions is Caleb Foote’s
1956 article, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration.129 After spending
almost three years observing Philadelphia’s lowest-level criminal courts,
Foote described a system that valued quick dispositions of cases above all
else, and that depended on deference to the police officers who brought the
charges, as opposed to the formal procedural safeguards that make up due
process.130 According to Foote, these safeguards, and what would later come
to be characterized as the “due process model”131 of criminal adjudication,
“do[] not penetrate to the world inhabited by the ‘bums’ of Philadelphia
. . . .”132 Rather, the judges of Philadelphia’s magistrate courts conducted
their hearings according to the more efficient and informal crime control
model.133
The mass processing of low-level charges without significant regard for
either substantive or procedural justice, however, is not merely an artifact of
history. In the almost half-century since Foote’s article was published, the
sheer number of cases processed through those courts has expanded greatly.
The “broken windows” era of policing has led to increased pressure on misdemeanor courtrooms and a greater perceived need for efficiency in the mass
processing of low-level crimes. This increased pressure has led to a tacit
agreement among institutional actors to streamline the process from arrest to
conviction. Accordingly, the progress toward greater actual due process

127

Id.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972).
129
Foote, supra note 122.
130
See id. at 649.
131
Packer, supra note 22, at 6.
132
Foote, supra note 122, at 604.
133
See also Steven Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 601, 621–23 (1975) (summarizing studies in the early 1970s of low-level
courts and the widespread failure of judges in those courts to inform defendants of their right
to appointed counsel); King, supra note 15, at 5–7 (comparing the situation described by Foote
with today’s misdemeanor courtrooms and arguing that reliance on the crime control model has
continued unabated while the consequences to misdemeanor defendants have become more
severe).
128
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safeguards in the misdemeanor criminal justice system has been halting at
best.
A 2011 study of Florida’s misdemeanor courts conducted by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers concluded that “[f]or
many of the nearly half million individuals who pass through Florida’s misdemeanor courts each year, due process is illusory.”134 The report found that
70% of misdemeanor defendants pled guilty or no contest at arraignment and
that the highest percentage of those entering such a plea at arraignment were
those defendants in custody.135 The average time of an arraignment proceeding (at which almost three of every four defendants waived their right to a
trial and admitted guilt) was 2.93 minutes.136 Not surprisingly, those defendants who admitted their guilt at their arraignment and waived their right to
trial were more likely to be unrepresented by counsel.137 The report concluded that the absence of counsel in the majority of the cases observed led
to an environment where ill- or unadvised defendants were opting for shortterm gain and long-term difficulties:
These findings raise significant concerns that unrepresented defendants . . . underestimate the non-immediate yet serious and
long-term consequences of misdemeanor convictions. Without information on the potential long-term and collateral consequences
. . . defendants underestimate the importance of counsel and the
collateral consequences to their post-plea quality-of-life.138
Factually guilty or not, a defendant charged with a misdemeanor might
choose a quick guilty plea over a drawn-out trial process. There is every
reason to believe that the phenomenon of wrongful convictions happens far
more often in low-level cases than in high-level cases.139 The difference
between the two, however, is that in low-level cases it is far more likely to
occur with the consent or acquiescence of the defendant, who chooses this

134
ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THREEMINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 14 (2011).
135
Id. at 15. This number is remarkably similar to the findings of a New York study from
2000: “[P]rivate attorneys representing indigent defendants through an assigned-counsel plan
‘were disposing of 69 percent of all misdemeanor cases at arraignment.’” Roberts, supra note
15, at 307 (quoting THE SPANGENBERG GRP., STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN NEW YORK: A
STUDY FOR CHIEF JUDGE KAYE’S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES
142 (2006), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefensecommission/SpangenbergGroup/Report.pdf).
136
SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 134, at 16.
137
Id. at 18.
138
Id.
139
See Natapoff, supra note 4, at 116 (“Lacking evidentiary rigor and adversarial testing,
[the world of low-level criminal adjudication] is a world in which a police officer’s bare
decision to arrest can lead inexorably, and with little scrutiny, to a guilty plea. It is, in other
words, a world largely lacking in a scrutinized evidentiary basis for guilt and therefore one in
which the risk of wrongful conviction is high.”).
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course of action, sometimes rationally (at least in the short term).140 The
hidden consequences of a conviction may not ever be explained to the person choosing to plead guilty, leading to unjust results that happen more regularly and more severely than ever before.141 While the consequences of a
conviction in a serious case are transparent, they can be opaque or invisible
in a misdemeanor until long after the conviction is complete. Counsel has
an important but often overlooked role to play in making these hidden consequences known to the defendant charged with a low-level crime.
C. Collateral Consequences
1. Background.
The “collateral consequences” of a criminal conviction have been defined as “all civil restrictions that flow from a criminal conviction.”142
Some have referred to these as “status-generated penalties” because it is the
subject’s status as a criminal (or as a certain type of criminal) that gives rise
to the extra-judicially imposed sanction.143 These collateral consequences
often constitute a far more serious form of punishment than the direct consequences of a conviction, especially for the many people convicted of lowlevel crimes who are never sentenced to incarceration.144 The Supreme
Court hinted at this long before Padilla, when it acknowledged in INS v. St.
Cyr that “‘[p]reserving the client’s right to remain in the United States may
be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.’” 145

140
See, e.g., Russell Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 79–80 (2009) (“[P]lea bargains will be most generous (and therefore most frequently accepted) in cases involving misdemeanors and other less serious offenses. The process costs expended by defendants will be particularly high relative to penalty
costs where only minor penalties are involved.”); King, supra note 15, at 10–11 (“The danger
of wrongful convictions in low-level prosecutions . . . comes from . . . the nonfeasance, rather
than the misfeasance or malfeasance, of the prosecutor.”); Roberts, supra note 15, at 302.
141
See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“In today’s criminal justice system, the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the
critical point for a defendant.”).
142
Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 154 (1999). Generally, the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction can be divided into two broad categories: collateral
sanctions and discretionary disqualifications. A collateral sanction is “a legal penalty, disability, or disadvantage . . . imposed on a person automatically upon that person’s conviction . . .
even if it is not included in the sentence.” AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS, R-7–R-8 (3d ed. 2004). By contrast, a discretionary disqualification is a “penalty, disability, or disadvantage . . . that a civil court, administrative agency, or official is authorized but
not required to impose on a person convicted of an offense on grounds related to the conviction.” Id.
143
See Love, supra note 119, at 91.
144
See Demleitner, supra note 142, at 154; Roberts, supra note 15, at 300.
145
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001) (quoting 3 MATTHEW BENDER, CRIMINAL
DEFENSE TECHNIQUES §§ 60A.01, 60A.02[2] (1999)).
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Because misdemeanor courtrooms typically lack the procedural protections and formality of felony courtrooms, the collateral consequences of
low-level convictions often catch convicted misdemeanants by surprise.146
Under the system currently in place in most states, defendants plead guilty to
low-level crimes with no knowledge of the serious and lasting effects of
their decision. Two of the great works to have examined the adjudication of
misdemeanor offenses are Caleb Foote’s 1956 article Vagrancy-Type Law
and Its Administration,147 and Malcolm Feeley’s 1979 book, The Process is
the Punishment.148 Indeed, much of what was described by Foote and Feeley
in the mid-twentieth century still rings true to anyone who spends time in
misdemeanor courtrooms today. Two significant changes have occurred
since the classic mid-twentieth century accounts of low-level prosecutions.
Inside the courtroom, the volume of such prosecutions has greatly increased.
Outside the courtroom, meanwhile, there has been a dramatic rise in the
scope and severity of the collateral consequences of a low-level conviction.
For the “vagrants” described by Foote and Feeley, a conviction doled out in
the rough justice of the low-level courts meant no more than the ten days in
jail or fine directly administered by the sentencing judge. Over the past few
decades, however, legislatures and nongovernmental entities have systematized and institutionalized a regime of collateral consequences, and technology has made those consequences ubiquitous and virtually inescapable.
Today, a person convicted of even a misdemeanor can suffer a panoply
of severe consequences, of which only the best known is related to immigration. Because of the Supreme Court’s recent focus on the immigration context in Padilla v. Kentucky, much has recently been written about
deportation as a consequence at least as severe as incarceration.149 Indeed,
the Court in Padilla recognized that it had long considered deportation a
“particularly severe penalty”150 and a “drastic measure.”151 As the dissenters in Padilla correctly pointed out, however, there is no logical stopping
point to the rationale of the majority opinion. As Justice Scalia argued,
“[t]he suggestion that counsel must warn defendants of potential removal
consequences . . . cannot be limited to those consequences except by judicial

146
See Natapoff, supra note 4, at 105 (“[M]isdemeanor convictions have become significant long-term burdens on individual defendants even though the processes by which such
convictions are generated fall far short of minimum legal and evidentiary standards taken for
granted in the felony world.”).
147
Foote, supra note 122.
148
FEELEY, supra note 8.
149
See e.g., Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Toward a Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 CARDOZO L.
REV. 585, 586 (2011); Love, supra note 119, at 91; Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1301 (2011); Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration
Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1708 (2011).
150
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (internal citations and punctuation
omitted).
151
Id. at 1478.
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caprice.”152 If the longstanding dichotomy between direct and collateral
consequences breaks down in the context of immigration, there is no reason
why it would not similarly break down in the context of a defendant facing
eviction, mandatory registration on a sex offender registry, or any number of
other consequences that have long been considered beyond the scope of the
criminal case itself.
2. Immigration.
Congress has dramatically changed the immigration-related consequences of a criminal conviction since the decision in Scott v. Illinois. Each
of the modern immigration reforms has made the deportation or excludability of those convicted of certain criminal offenses more automatic by limiting the possibility of discretionary relief.153 For instance, in 1990, Congress
stripped sentencing judges of the power to grant a judicial recommendation
against deportation (JRAD).154 In 1996, Congress went one step further and
152
Id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Alito also predicted that the holding in
Padilla would be impossible to contain and could expand to apply to many other indirect
consequences of a criminal conviction:

This case happens to involve removal, but criminal convictions can carry a wide
variety of consequences other than conviction and sentencing, including civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote, disqualification from public
benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, dishonorable discharge from the Armed
Forces, and loss of business or professional licenses. A criminal conviction may also
severely damage a defendant’s reputation and thus impair the defendant’s ability to
obtain future employment or business opportunities. All of these consequences are
“serious,” but this Court has never held that a criminal defense attorney’s Sixth
Amendment duties extend to providing advice about such matters.
Id. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring) (internal citations and punctuation omitted). State courts
have begun to use Padilla as authority to allow for the withdrawal of guilty pleas where, for
instance, counsel has either failed to advise or has provided incorrect advice about the loss of
pension benefits and about sex offender registration. See State v. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d 878,
890–95 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (allowing defendant to withdraw guilty plea to child enticement
because defense counsel failed to provide any advice on the issue of mandatory sex offender
registration); State v. Powell, 935 N.E.2d 85, 92 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (allowing defendant to
withdraw guilty plea to voyeurism because defense counsel provided incorrect advice regarding sex offender registration requirements).
153
See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (“While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited the
authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation.”).
154
See id. at 1480. The Padilla Court summarized the dramatic change enacted by Congress in 1990 by describing the previous procedure:
At the time of sentencing or within 30 days thereafter, the sentencing judge in both
state and federal prosecutions had the power to make a recommendation “that such
alien shall not be deported.” This procedure, known as a judicial recommendation
against deportation, or JRAD, had the effect of binding the Executive to prevent
deportation; the statute was “consistently . . . interpreted as giving the sentencing
judge conclusive authority to decide whether a particular conviction should be disregarded as a basis for deportation.” Thus, from 1917 [until 1990], there was no such
creature as an automatically deportable offense. Even as the class of deportable
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eliminated the Attorney General’s authority to grant discretionary relief from
deportation.155
At the same time, the scope of criminal offenses that can subject someone to this near-automatic deportation has grown ever larger. Crimes involving moral turpitude and those classified as an “aggravated felony” have
long rendered an alien subject to deportation in the United States.156 These
elastic categories of criminal offenses have continued to grow, and now encompass many crimes that rarely carry a jail sentence, including shoplifting,
driving under the influence of alcohol, possession of any type of drug (although a small amount of marijuana for personal use still does not qualify),
and assault on a family member.157
Because of these changes in immigration policy, the number of people
who face deportation because of a criminal conviction has skyrocketed in the
past three decades: In 1979, when the Supreme Court decided Scott, 264
noncitizens were deported because of a criminal conviction.158 By contrast,
in 2004, 42,510 noncitizens were deported on this basis.159 In fiscal year
2011, 216,698 of the noncitizens removed from the country had been convicted of a crime.160
3. Sex Offender Registries.
Another way in which the broader context has changed since Scott is
the spread of sex offender registries. In 1979, when the Court decided Scott,
few states had statewide criminal registries and the widespread belief was
that such registries and community notification had failed and were likely

offenses expanded, judges retained discretion to ameliorate unjust results on a caseby-case basis.
Id. at 1479 (citation omitted).
155
During the five years after Congress eliminated the JRAD, the Attorney General exercised his authority to prevent the deportation of over 10,000 noncitizens that had been convicted of a crime making them otherwise deportable. Id. at 1480. In 1996, however, Congress
eliminated the power of the Attorney General to prevent deportation in this manner. See id.
156
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii) (2012).
157
See Clapman, supra note 149, at 591–92 (2011) (describing the aggressive broadening
by Congress of the categories of deportable offenses, especially during the 1990s).
158
IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 187 tbl. 67 (1999), available
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/1997YB.pdf.
159
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2004 YEARBOOK
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 161 tbl. 42, available at http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/
publications/YrBk04En.shtm.
160
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FY 2011: ICE ANNOUNCES YEAREND REMOVAL NUMBERS, HIGHLIGHTS FOCUS ON KEY PRIORITIES INCLUDING THREATS TO PUBLIC SAFETY AND NATIONAL SECURITY (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/
releases/1110/111018washingtondc.htm. This number might overrepresent somewhat the
number of noncitizens removed because of their criminal convictions because someone with a
criminal conviction could, of course, be removed for some other reason. Almost 36,000 noncitizens were deported due to a conviction for driving under the influence, an offense that is
usually classified as a misdemeanor and that frequently results in no incarceration. See id.
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soon to disappear completely.161 Certainly, the members of the Court would
have had no reason even to consider the possibility that a misdemeanor conviction could result in lifetime registration in a nationwide database; this
potential collateral consequence does not even merit a mention in the Scott
opinion.162 At the time that the Supreme Court decided Scott, the consensus
among those considering the issue was that collateral consequences were
generally fading away. Indeed, just a few years after the Scott opinion, the
American Bar Association considered the state of collateral consequences of
criminal convictions and saw a trajectory toward abolition: “As the number
of disabilities [collateral consequences] diminishes and their imposition becomes more rationally based and more restricted in coverage, the need for
expungement and nullification statutes decreases.”163 The fact that criminal
registration statutes were so rare and the belief that they were fast becoming
obsolete explain their lack of inclusion in the discussion about which offenses are “petty” and which are “serious.”
Today, both the reach and the scope of such registries are breathtaking.
Within a few short years at the beginning of the 1990s, states implemented
sex offender registries at a rapid clip, and by 1996, every jurisdiction had
passed a law requiring those convicted of certain sex offenses to register.164
In 1994, the federal government first began to condition the grant of certain
federal funds on states’ implementation of systems to track the whereabouts
of sex offenders.165 While the 1994 federal law only required states to maintain and track sex offenders, Congress soon thereafter expanded the reach of
the statute to require notification to a community when a sex offender lived
nearby.166 In 2003, Congress updated the 1996 law to require states to maintain a publicly accessible website containing information about sex offenders
161

See WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMNOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 20–48 (2009); Lindsay B. Fetzer, The Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act: No More Than “‘Statutory Lip Service’ to Interstate
Commerce”, 16 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 483, 487–89 (2010).
162
Wayne Logan has shown how the popularity of registration laws gradually fell from
their peak around the middle of the twentieth century to a point where “registration laws
scarcely figured in American life.” LOGAN, supra note 161, at 48. Between 1968 and 1984,
no state passed a new registration law and, in 1978, Arizona repealed its criminal registration
law. Id. at 46.
163
AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS § 23-8.2 cmt. at 143 (2d ed. 1983), quoted in Love, supra note 119, at 115.
164
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE U.S.
47–49 (2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0907webwcover.
pdf.
165
42 U.S.C. § 14072 (1994). This legislation, also known as the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, was passed in response to
the abduction of an eleven-year-old boy from his rural Minnesota neighborhood. See LOGAN,
supra note 161, at 55–60.
166
42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (2000). Like the 1994 statute, this legislation followed the
highly publicized rape and murder of a child. It is popularly known as “Megan’s Law” after
seven-year-old Megan Kanka. See generally Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s
Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315 (2001), for a detailed discussion of the
history of legislation involving sex offender registration.
MUNITY
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and the locations of their residence.167 Most recently, in 2006, Congress
overhauled the system of sex offender registries, expanding the national registry and requiring states to share the information in state registries with each
other.168 In terms of reach, every state now has an online sex offender registry, a system of community notification, and a system of exchanging information with other states and the federal government.169 In terms of scope,
registries have expanded to include those convicted of even very minor misdemeanor offenses.170 More than 700,000 people are currently on some kind
of sex offender registry in the United States.171
4. Sentencing Enhancements.
The introduction and proliferation of sentencing guidelines since the
early 1980s has given rise to an additional consequence of any criminal con167

42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2003).
42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006). See also Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and
Community Notification: Past, Present, and Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 10 (2008) (describing the increased requirements imposed on states by the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, including requirements of community notification and that states share information with other states and with the federal government).
169
See LOGAN, supra note 161, at 66–74; see also Fetzer, supra note 161, at 489.
170
See Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in
Sex Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1081–82 (2012) (describing such
registries as growing “dramatically in number and scope”). See generally Phoebe Geer, Justice Served? The High Cost of Juvenile Sex Offender Registration, 27 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH
L. 33 (2008) (discussing the expansion of such registries to include juvenile offenders). One
of the earliest states to adopt a sex offender registry was California. In an interesting precursor
to Padilla v. Kentucky, the California Supreme Court in 1973 considered whether a guilty plea
for a misdemeanor for lewd and dissolute conduct was knowing and voluntary when it was
made without the defendant’s knowledge that it carried a collateral consequence of lifetime
registration on the state’s sexual offender registry. In re Birch, 515 P.2d 12 (Cal. 1973). The
unrepresented defendant, who was arrested for urinating in public, argued that his lack of
knowledge of the registration requirement rendered his guilty plea invalid. Id. at 14. The
California Supreme Court agreed, citing the “unusual and onerous nature” of the registration
requirement and explaining that “[a]lthough the stigma of a short jail sentence should eventually fade, the ignominious badge carried by the convicted sex offender can remain for a lifetime.” Id. at 16–17, cited in LOGAN, supra note 161, at 44. The Court in Birch went on to
describe the unlikelihood that the defendant could have foreseen the dire and permanent collateral consequence of registration: “While petitioner possibly might have suspected that a guilty
plea could result in a short jail sentence, we cannot believe that he was aware that as a consequence of urinating in a parking lot at 1:30 in the morning he would be required to register as a
sex offender. . . . Without this [awareness], we conclude that petitioner’s . . . plea of guilty
cannot be regarded as having been knowingly and intelligently made.” Birch, 515 P.2d at 17.
171
Alan Greenblatt, States Struggle to Control Sex Offender Costs, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(May 28, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=127220896, cited in
Emily J. Stine, When Yes Means No, Legally: An Eighth Amendment Challenge to Classifying
Consenting Teenagers as Sex Offenders, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169, 1176 n.49 (2011). The
phenomenon of widespread and inescapable collateral consequences has begun to make appearances in popular culture as well. See RUSSELL BANKS, LOST MEMORY OF SKIN (2011)
(describing a community of convicted sex offenders living together in tents under a causeway,
a result of being legally unable to reside within 2,500 feet of a school, church, or playground);
HORRIBLE BOSSES (New Line Cinema 2011) (showing a character who, after being convicted
of urinating in public, is required to register as a sex offender and has difficulty finding employment as a result).
168
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viction.172 Today, even a low-level conviction can also result in a drastic
increase in punishment for any subsequent criminal conviction. In 1994, in
Nichols v. United States, the Court held that an uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction, valid under Scott v. Illinois, may be used to enhance the punishment of any subsequent conviction.173 The defendant in Nichols had previously appeared without counsel and been convicted of driving under the
influence, a misdemeanor for which he received a $250 fine and no sentence
of incarceration.174 Seven years later, he entered a plea of guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute; under the federal sentencing guidelines, he was assessed a criminal history point for his prior
uncounseled misdemeanor DUI conviction, moving him from Criminal History Category II to Category III.175 The defendant’s guideline range thus
moved from a range of 168–210 months to a range of 188–235 months, an
increase of approximately two years of incarceration.176 The Court affirmed
the defendant’s 235-month prison sentence, holding that the additional
twenty-five months of incarceration were not punishment for the prior uncounseled misdemeanor offense but instead for the instant offense.177 The
Nichols majority ruled that the increase in the defendant’s subsequent sentence did “not change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction”178 and
held that “an uncounseled conviction valid under Scott may be relied upon
to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense, even though that sentence
entails imprisonment.”179 Although state and federal guidelines systems are
no longer mandatory,180 calculations of prior criminal history continue to

172
See Frank O. Bowman III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1328–33 (2005) (discussing the vast difference
between the severity of sentences imposed before and after the federal sentencing guidelines
became effective); Michael Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration: Why is California Lagging
Behind?, 28 GA. ST. L. REV. 1275, 1280–81 (2012) (discussing the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 and subsequent increases in incarceration brought about by policy changes like California’s Three Strikes law).
173
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748–49 (1994).
174
Id. at 740.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 747.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 746–47. Some states have rejected the rationale of Nichols on state constitutional
grounds, deciding that the inherent unreliability of an uncounseled conviction precludes its use
in enhancing a subsequent sentence. See, e.g., State v. Hrycak, 877 A.2d 1209, 1216 (N.J.
2005) (“We are convinced that a prior uncounseled DWI conviction of an indigent is not
sufficiently reliable to permit increased jail sanctions under the enhancement statute.”); see
also State v. Kelly, 999 So.2d 1029, 1053 (Fla. 2008) (similar); State v. Deville, 879 So.2d
689, 690 (La. 2004) (stating that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction for driving while
intoxicated “may not serve as the predicate for enhancement of a subsequent D.W.I. offense in
the absence of a valid waiver of counsel. . . . [T]his rule applies without regard to whether the
defendant actually served a term of imprisonment for the prior offense.”).
180
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296, 301 (2004).
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have enormous influence on sentences.181 In addition to the sentencing context, civil commitment statutes (or sexually violent predator statutes) rely on
prior convictions, and can certainly rely on an uncounseled misdemeanor
sex-related conviction.182
5. Child Custody and Parental Rights.
Many states now require family court judges, while conducting a “best
interests of the child” determination, to consider criminal history as a factor
in awarding custody of children.183 The reappearance of a petty conviction
in such an important proceeding surely comes as a surprise to those who
have pled guilty years earlier to minor charges with very little direct consequence. One such example is Samuel DeNillo, who had been charged with
two counts of indecent exposure in Pennsylvania.184 Prior to trial, Mr.
DeNillo was offered the chance to resolve the charges without a conviction
through participation in the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD)
program for first-time offenders.185 Pursuant to the terms of the ARD program, Mr. DeNillo was given two years of probation and ordered to undergo
a mental evaluation and to pay court costs; at the completion of the two
years, the charges against him would be dismissed.186 Three years after
agreeing to enter the ARD program, Mr. DeNillo found himself in a custody
dispute with his ex-wife.187 When his ex-wife urged the family court judge
to consider the indecent exposure charges against Mr. DeNillo in determining his fitness as a custodian, Mr. DeNillo explained that he was innocent
but “consented to ARD only to avoid the embarrassment of a trial.”188 The
family court judge credited this explanation and did not consider the indecent exposure charges.189 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed this
decision, however, concluding that the court below had abused its discretion
by not considering the dismissed charges: “We believe that the criminal

181
See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2007) (instructing district judges to
continue to engage in guidelines calculations even after such guidelines had been held to be
advisory in nature rather than mandatory); U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2011) (“A defendant’s record of past criminal conduct is
directly relevant to [purposes of calculating an appropriate sentence]. A defendant with a
record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of
greater punishment.”)
182
See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences
of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators”, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 670, 711 (2008).
183
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722 (2009); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5329 (2011);
Meins v. Meins, 218 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Ark. 2005); In re Marriage of Ortiz, 801 P.2d 767, 770
(Or. 1990).
184
DeNillo v. DeNillo, 535 A.2d 200, 200 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
185
Id. at 201.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 204 (Beck, J., dissenting).
189
Id.
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charges against appellee, even though disposed of through ARD, are relevant in this custody dispute. . . . ‘[I]t is also important to remember that a
criminal suspect’s election of ARD is a voluntary decision.’” 190 Just as Mr.
Nichols decided, without benefit of counsel, to enter a plea of guilty to his
DUI charge that carried no risk of incarceration, so did Mr. DeNillo decide
to accept a non-criminal resolution to the criminal charges against him. In
Mr. Nichols’s case, what seemed like an easy decision resulted in an additional twenty-five months of incarceration. In Mr. DeNillo’s case, his decision impacted his ability to have joint custody of his child.
6. Employment.
Loss of employment or the ability to gain future employment, while
always a potential informal collateral consequence of a criminal conviction,
has taken on an increased importance in recent years. Criminal background
checks are now quick, cheap, and available online, and can search all levels
of criminal conviction from throughout the country.191 The uncounseled
misdemeanor defendant who pleads guilty to shoplifting in Oregon in exchange for a small fine may be surprised years later when that conviction
prevents her from getting a job in New York. Forty years ago, Justice Powell
recognized that “[t]he consequences of a misdemeanor conviction . . . or the
effect of a criminal record on employability, are frequently of sufficient
magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the label ‘petty.’” 192 As true as
that was before the age of Google and online background checks, it is far
truer today.193 This real-world change in the meaning of a criminal conviction has been acknowledged by the American Bar Association in its attempt
to develop standards relating to the collateral consequences of a criminal
conviction: “The collateral consequences of conviction have been increasing
steadily in variety and severity for the past 20 years, and their lingering
effects have become increasingly difficult to shake off.” 194 Stories of people
who have led law-abiding lives for years but are still burdened by a decades190
Id. at 202 (majority opinion) (alterations in original) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Becker, 530 A.2d 888, 892 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)).
191
See Roberts, supra note 15, at 287 nn.40–45.
192
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 47–48 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
193
No longer can a person convicted of a crime escape her past by declaring that she is
GTT, or “Gone to Texas,” as many people did in the 1800s to escape debts or criminal convictions. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Texas developed the reputation for harboring
outlaws, and the houses of people in other states who had absconded were marked in chalk
with the initials “GTT.” See FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED, A JOURNEY THROUGH TEXAS, OR, A
SADDLE-TRIP ON THE SOUTHWESTERN FRONTIER 124 (1857) (“[M]any an adventurer crossed
the border, spurred by a love of life or liberty, forfeited at home, rather than drawn by the love
of adventure or of rich soil. . . . ‘G.T.T.,’ (or gone to Texas) was the slang appendage . . . to
every man’s name who had disappeared before the discovery of some rascality. Did a man
emigrate thither, every one was on the watch for the discreditable reason to turn up.”); Tex.
State Historical Ass’n, GTT, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/pfg01 (last visited Jan. 25, 2012).
194
AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 142, at 8 (emphasis added).
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old criminal conviction have received increasing attention in the press and
popular culture.195
7. Impact on the Community.
The effects of the current regime of collateral sentencing consequences,
moreover, are felt not just on discrete individuals but also on whole communities. “Ultimately, exclusions from the political, economic and social
spheres of life undermine the notion that offenders can ever be successfully
rehabilitated. . . . [C]ollateral sentencing consequences have contributed to
exiling ex-offenders within their country, even after expiration of their maximum sentences.”196 As large numbers of particular groups are stigmatized
and disempowered through the reach of collateral consequences, whole communities are marginalized and excluded from participation in mainstream
society.197 The result is a de facto “sorting” of the population into two categories: those allowed full participation in society and those deemed unworthy of full participation. This sorting is accomplished by the criminal justice
system but given meaning by the entirely different and external system of
collateral consequences.
The imposition of social disability and ostracism after conviction of a
crime is nothing new. Conviction of serious crime has long carried the consequence of “civil death,” by which the offender was seen as having forfeited certain fundamental social rights.198 But whereas the historical
phenomenon of civil death was limited in the past to the most serious categories of criminal activity, the current trend over the last quarter-century has
been to alienate and exclude offenders through collateral consequences, even
when convicted of very minor convictions.
8. Enhanced Impact of Collateral Consequences.
Although a criminal conviction has always carried with it consequences
that are external to the sentencing process, both in terms of informal stigma
195
See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Paying a Price, Long After the
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012, at A23 (describing a case where a man was not hired on the
basis of a conviction more than twenty years old, for which he had received probation); Adam
Cohen, Why We Need to Protect Ex-Con Job Seekers from Discrimination, TIME MAGAZINE
(Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2086114,00.html (discussing
the increasing difficulty of finding employment with a criminal record); Alana Semuels, It’s a
Bad Time for Job Seekers With Criminal Records, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/30/business/la-fi-felon-jobs-20101130.
196
Demleitner, supra note 142, at 154.
197
See Andrew E. Taslitz, Destroying the Village to Save It: The Warfare Analogy (Or
Dis-Analogy?) and the Moral Imperative to Address Collateral Consequences, 54 HOW. L.J.
501, 511–12 (2011) (“Too little of the commentary on the social harm done [by collateral
consequences] focuses on the dangers of group-based exclusion in a thorough fashion . . . .”).
198
See, e.g., Chin, supra note 121, at 1790; Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV.
1045, 1059–64 (2011–2012).
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and formal restrictions on civil participation, these consequences were historically secondary to the direct consequences of a conviction.199 Today,
however, even a misdemeanor conviction that results in no imprisonment
can result in the loss of the right to possess a firearm,200 to serve in the
military,201 to live in public housing,202 to receive student aid and other public benefits,203 to drive a car legally,204 and to adopt a child.205
One of the peculiar hallmarks of collateral consequences, and one that
is troubling from a due process standpoint, is that they “are neither imposed
in open court nor subjected to a proportionality analysis.”206 Because collateral consequences have long been seen as civil consequences, they have re199
Convictions of certain serious crimes have for centuries carried with them social disabilities such as the loss of the right to vote, serve on juries, or hold public office. See Chin,
supra note 121, at 1806–07 (“Courts have imposed few limits on creation and implementation
of collateral consequences. They are generally regarded as nonpunitive. Accordingly, they are
not evaluated for overall proportionality, nor is there significant scrutiny for reasonableness.”);
King, supra note 15, at 7; Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 638–39 (2006) (“Despite their proliferation . . . collateral
consequences remain excluded from the criminal process.”); Roberts, supra note 182, at 678
(discussing the difference between direct and collateral consequences of criminal convictions).
200
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2011) (prohibiting a person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing firearms or ammunition).
201
See AM. BAR ASS’N, INTERNAL EXILE: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION IN
FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS 18 (2009), available at http://americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/migrated/cecs/internalexile.authcheckdam.pdf (“Department of Defense internal policy . . .
bars people with misdemeanor convictions, including misdemeanor domestic violence, from
enlisting unless a waiver is granted. This bar, however, is not statutory.”).
202
The Supreme Court has upheld a policy of evicting tenants of public housing when
those tenants, a household member, or a guest engages in drug-related activity in the public
housing, regardless of whether those tenants knew or should have known about the drugrelated activity. See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002).
Current federal public housing law continues to require that, subject to certain limited exceptions contained in the statute, all public housing agencies:

R
R
R

shall utilize leases which . . . provide that any criminal activity that threatens the
health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any
drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other person under
the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2006).
203
See 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2012) (making ineligible for federal student financial aid
those who have been convicted of any crime involving “the possession or sale of a controlled
substance for conduct that occurred during a period of enrollment for which the student was
receiving any grant, loan, or work assistance . . . .”). The same statute contains a provision by
which a person made ineligible for student financial assistance may prove their “rehabilitation” and resume receiving federal student financial aid. See id. at § 1091(r)(2).
204
See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 201, at 41 (citing 23 U.S.C. § 159 (2012)).
205
See McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of Padilla v. Kentucky and its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L.J. 795, 825
(2011) (describing the impact of certain types of criminal convictions on custody issues and
parental rights). For a comprehensive catalog of collateral consequences, see AM. BAR ASS’N,
supra note 142, at 7; see also generally AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 201.
206
Nora V. Demleitner, Smart Public Policy: Replacing Imprisonment with Targeted Nonprison Sentences and Collateral Sanctions, 58 STAN. L. REV. 339, 341 (2005); see also id. at
356 (referring to collateral consequences as “invisible mandatory minimum sentences, fre-
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mained outside the scope of the criminal justice system. Courts are
institutionally incapable of controlling the spread of collateral consequences
precisely because the consequences have always been considered collateral
to the criminal proceeding. Calls to roll back or eliminate collateral consequences, therefore, have been unsuccessful.207 Where courts do have an institutional ability to effect change in this regard is in the provision of
safeguards in the criminal process: there is no more fundamental safeguard
than the appointment of counsel.
D. State Experimentation with Quasi-Criminal and Non-Criminal
Resolutions
As state criminal justice systems have come under increasing financial
strain in the last few years, courts and legislatures have begun experimenting
anew with a move to a quasi-criminal type of adjudication: drug courts, diversionary programs, and the expansion of the class of non-jailable offenses.
This expansion of quasi-criminal adjudication can act even to further constrain the right to counsel without addressing the consequences that follow
from a conviction.
One such proposal in Virginia in 2010 would have made certain misdemeanors presumptively non-jailable; judges would only appoint counsel if
the prosecutor affirmatively announced prior to trial that the state intended to
seek imprisonment or if the judge believed that imprisonment might be appropriate.208 In fact, this is not unlike what happens informally on a regular
basis quite often: At the initial hearing of an accused before a judge, the
judge asks the prosecutor whether or not the state is seeking imprisonment.
If the answer is no, the accused is not appointed counsel.209 All the Virginia
proposal would have done is to formalize that process.
There is a significant difference, however, among the different systems
that seek to adjudicate without defense lawyers. Some remove the adjudicative process entirely from the criminal justice system. Others simply remove
the possibility of incarceration but leave the process within the world of
traditional criminal adjudication. In contrast to the Virginia legislative proposal described above, the State of California recently changed the petty
quently imposed on a vast array of offenders without their knowledge and without any
recourse”).
207
For an excellent description of the various legal challenges and policy arguments advocating against the seemingly inexorable increase in collateral consequences, see Pinard, supra
note 199, at 636–49.
208
H.B. 1394, 2010 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010). See also Deirdre Fernandes, Bill
Looks to Trim Attorney Costs, THE ROANOKE TIMES (Mar. 17, 2010), http://www.roanoke.com/
politics/wb/239053 (“Supporters of HB 1394 suggest that it will save Virginia several million
dollars . . . .”).
209
This is routine practice in many misdemeanor courtrooms already. See generally King,
supra note 15; Anita Ortiz Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A New Chapter in Supreme Court
Jurisprudence on Whether Deportation Constitutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent Residents?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2011).
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crime of possession of a small amount of marijuana from a criminal charge
to a civil infraction.210 In explaining his decision to sign the bill into law, the
California governor recognized that “[i]n this time of drastic budget cuts,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, law enforcement, and the courts cannot afford to expend limited resources prosecuting a crime that carries the same
punishment as a traffic ticket.”211 Other states have responded in a similar
fashion, especially with regard to the possession of small amounts of marijuana.212 It might seem at first blush that there is little difference between a
petty criminal offense that carries — as previous California law did — no
potential for imprisonment and a civil infraction for the same behavior that
carries the same potential fine. The enormous difference, however, comes
with the collateral consequences. While the person convicted of the crime of
possession of a small amount of marijuana would become ineligible for federal student aid, for example, no such consequence would apply to the person who is found to have committed the civil infraction for the same
offense.213
Under the Scott doctrine, states are free to be as creative and as punitive
as possible in fashioning criminal sanctions without triggering a right to appointed counsel, as long as those sanctions do not involve incarceration. Indeed, such a response is a rational response to the current fiscal crisis and the
constitutional landscape regarding the right to counsel. Although the various
types of alternative approaches discussed above can achieve the laudable
goals of reducing the number of people incarcerated and the costs to the state
of housing them, they do not diminish the real collateral consequences to
individuals and communities.214 The very real effect of misdemeanor adjudication is not to punish directly but instead to achieve a sorting of those with
full legal rights and those who must endure “a permanent debasement of
210

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357(b) (West 2010).
Letter from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal., to the Members of the Cal.
State Senate (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://www.salem-news.com/articles/october
012010/schwarzenegger-marijuana.php, quoted in Roberts, supra note 15, at 331.
212
Roberts, supra note 15, at 332 (listing California, Hawaii, and Massachusetts as examples of states that have moved some previously criminal offenses into the civil infraction
system).
213
The relevant federal statute prohibits federal student financial aid for a period of time
for those who have been “convicted of any offense” involving the “possession or sale of a
controlled substance for conduct that occurred during a period of enrollment for which the
student was receiving [federal financial student aid].” 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2012).
214
As Wayne Logan describes:
211

When governments are less punitive, either with respect to the use of incarceration
or the quantum of punishment, they avoid the need to extend jury and appointed
counsel rights, with consequent resource savings, but negative consequences for individuals. The disadvantages associated with lack of trial counsel have long been
known and uncounseled convictions can later be used both to enhance punishment
for subsequent convictions and justify deportation.
Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal Laws and the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 157–58 (2009)
(citations omitted).
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legal status.”215 Legislative or judicial “fixes” that simply make this sorting
easier by removing procedural safeguards like the right to counsel may
achieve financial savings, but at the cost of accuracy, perceived justice, and
actual justice.
III. THE EVOLVING RIGHT

TO

COUNSEL

A. Padilla’s Challenge to Scott
The explosion of low-level criminal prosecutions that resulted from the
advent of the broken windows philosophy happened almost immediately after the Supreme Court limited the right to appointed counsel to those cases
involving actual incarceration. The Court’s decision in Scott reflected an
understanding of a world that was soon to disappear. As noted at the end of
Part I(C), in evaluating the seriousness of a misdemeanor conviction, the
Court in 1979 could not have conceived of a world in which such a conviction would regularly and automatically result in deportation, long-term registration requirements, and all of the other consequences that have become
regular post-scripts to contemporary misdemeanor convictions.216
Central to the Court’s analysis in Scott was the idea that incarceration
was different from other punishments not just in degree but also in kind. In
drawing the bright line at liberty, the Court accepted the argument of the
State that incarceration was meaningfully different from other punishments.217 As the State of Illinois argued in its brief to the Court: “Loss of
. . . liberty has traditionally been viewed as a penalty which is inherently
degrading, which stigmatizes an individual by its very imposition and which
is almost exclusively imposed as a result of the criminal process.”218
This conclusion was not, however, unanimously accepted by the members of the Court in Argersinger and Scott. Indeed, Justice Powell’s rejection
of incarceration as the sine qua non of seriousness resounds in the current
world of ubiquitous and severe collateral consequences.219 The current system roughly sorts the population into two categories: criminal and non-criminal. The sentencing aspect of a misdemeanor judge is of vastly diminished
importance; once the accused is separated into one of those two piles, a
separate and external system — that of collateral consequences — imposes
punishment.
215

Love, supra note 119, at 114.
Even Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Argersinger, which argued for taking into
account the “seriousness” of consequences other than incarceration, only mentioned social
stigma, difficulty finding employment, loss of a license to drive or other professional license,
and the loss of pension rights. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 n.11 (1972) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
217
See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372–73 (1979).
218
Brief for Respondent at 8, Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (No. 77-1177), 1978
WL 206719.
219
See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 47–48 (Powell, J., concurring).
216
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The Supreme Court may have recently shown a willingness to reconsider both the rigid dichotomy between petty and serious offenses in this
context and the fact of incarceration as the touchstone between the two categories of offenses. In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court addressed a situation in
which the non-citizen defendant’s lawyer advised him incorrectly that he
“ ‘did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the
country so long.’” 220 Rather than resolving the case narrowly, the Court
wrote broadly, holding that defense counsel had an obligation to give correct
advice regarding the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction, at
least “when the deportation consequence is truly clear . . . .”221 The Court
explicitly rejected the narrower approach urged by Justice Alito, which
would have only required that defense counsel refrain from giving incorrect
advice.222 Instead, the majority held that “[i]t is quintessentially the duty of
counsel to provide her client with available advice about an issue like deportation and the failure to do so ‘clearly satisfies the [deficient performance]
prong of the Strickland analysis.’” 223 Although Padilla involved a felony
charge of marijuana trafficking, the deportation consequences would have
been the same if the defendant had been charged with simple possession of
marijuana or some other drug — both misdemeanors.224 And if, in that hypothetical possession of marijuana charge, the prosecutor had agreed prior to
trial not to seek incarceration, the defendant would not have had any federal
constitutional right to counsel.225 Padilla seems to confer a right to the effective assistance of counsel, then, on a class of defendants that has no right to
counsel at all under the Scott doctrine.
Although Padilla concerned a felony drug trafficking offense, its logic
is by no means confined to that context. And although its holding was limited to the context of ineffective assistance of counsel and the effect on the
knowing and voluntary nature of a guilty plea, it is significant that the Court
rejected the idea that there is a meaningful difference between the direct and

220

Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1483.
222
Id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring).
223
Id. at 1484 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). In Strickland v. Washington, the
Court laid out the basic contours of defining constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel,
holding that a petitioner must establish both constitutionally deficient performance by counsel
and also that such deficient performance was prejudicial to the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–93 (1984). The Court has, of course, elaborated on both prongs of
the analysis in subsequent cases.
224
Although possession of fewer than thirty grams of marijuana would not constitute a
deportable offense, virtually any other offense involving controlled substances would render
the person deportable if convicted. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
225
See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979). Of course, the judge retains ultimate power to decide whether or not to eliminate incarceration from the range of potential
punishments and therefore the power to bring the defendant within or outside of the scope of
the federal constitutional right to counsel. The dispositive factor in this calculation, however,
is likely to be the prosecutor’s stated intent either to seek a sentence involving incarceration or
not. See supra Part II.D.
221
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collateral consequences of a criminal conviction.226 Despite the Padilla
Court’s repeated characterization of deportation as a “unique” type of consequence, it nevertheless recognized what Justice Powell had argued in
Argersinger: that the sole factor of incarceration is not always the best indicator of seriousness.227 Indeed, in the misdemeanor context, where the
amount of potential incarceration is quite low but the collateral consequences are significant, the use of incarceration as a proxy for seriousness is
especially crude.228 The Court’s majority opinion in Padilla greatly undermines the logic of the Scott doctrine and suggests the possibility for rethinking the federal constitutional right to counsel to respond more appropriately
to contemporary realities.
Although it involved a felony, Padilla v. Kentucky has broad implications for misdemeanor practice. Padilla has added to the burden for these
public defenders and court-appointed lawyers by stating unequivocally that
it is the job of the defense lawyer to advise clients correctly on at least
certain categories of clear collateral consequences of a criminal conviction.229 Most simply, a defense lawyer now has a clear duty under Padilla to
educate herself on at least the immigration-related collateral consequences of
the various types of criminal convictions in the cases she handles.230 She
then must advise her client about the long-term collateral consequences of a
guilty plea, which might well have the effect of convincing the client to
reject a seemingly generous time-served plea offer and proceed to trial, further complicating the life of the overworked and under-resourced public defender.231 Although we might prefer the criminal justice system to consist of
well-informed defendants making rational long-term decisions, the brunt of
226
See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (“We . . . have never applied a distinction between
direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’ required under Strickland. . . . Whether that distinction is appropriate is a
question we need not consider in this case because of the unique nature of deportation.”)
(citation omitted).
227
See id. at 1482. The Court’s description of deportation as “uniquely difficult to classify
as either a direct or a collateral consequence” is somewhat puzzling because it always remains
outside of the control of the sentencing judge. See Love, supra note 119, at 94–95 nn.33–38
(describing various tests that courts have used to classify a consequence as either “direct” or
“collateral”).
228
Roberts, supra note 15, at 298–303.
229
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 (“[W]hen the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it
was here, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.”); see also id. at 1495–96 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (describing the logic of the majority opinion as having “no logical stopping-point”
to the defense lawyer’s duty to advise).
230
See id. at 1482 (majority opinion) (“The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.”). Although the Padilla majority endeavored to limit the holding to clear immigration
consequences, lower courts have applied the Padilla rationale and its resulting duty to advise
correctly defendants in other contexts, including, for example, sex offender registration. See,
e.g., Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010); Taylor v. State, 304 Ga.
App. 878, 884 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 405 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
2010).
231
BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 113, at 34.
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carrying out these improvements is borne by public defenders and courtappointed lawyers.232 Without some accommodation or incentives to accompany any formal systemic reform, it is hard to imagine the practice on the
ground improving in any meaningful sense.233
Although instances in which the law formally allows for a different
level of procedural safeguards based on the seriousness of the charged offense are rare (right to trial by jury, for example, and some differences in
statutory entitlement to discovery), accounts from misdemeanor courtrooms
suggest a level of due process significantly different from felony courtrooms. But if the broader context has changed to make that underlying premise no longer true, and if the true meaning of a misdemeanor conviction
has changed, then that changed context requires a corresponding change in
the actual structure of adjudicating misdemeanor offenses. As the actual
consequences of a misdemeanor conviction — both direct and collateral —
increase, formal procedural safeguards must be applied to that category of
offenses that has been designated, less and less accurately, as “petty.”
B. Weighing Costs and Rights
Two obvious critiques of expanding the right to counsel must be addressed. First, as with every previous proposal to expand the scope of the
right to court-appointed counsel, issues of cost are in the fore.234 Politically,
the idea of expanding the right to counsel to people charged with low-level
crimes is a tough sell at any time, but especially in a time of fiscal crisis.235
Such cost-based arguments have been made against every expansion of the
right to counsel.236 Second, it is widely acknowledged that the current system of indigent defense representation fails to deliver effective representation to those facing criminal charges, even in serious crimes. The question
of why we should expand such a broken system is a valid one and deserves
consideration.
232
See Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393,
1396 (2011) (“For appointed counsel and the state and local entities that pay them, Padilla is
an unfunded mandate: Defense lawyers now must know more immigration law in addition to
criminal law.”).
233
See generally Roberts, supra note 15 (describing different institutional capabilities and
limitations in reforming the system).
234
See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2510–11 (2011); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367, 373–74 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 49–50 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
72–73 (1932).
235
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 25, was decided in 1972, and one of the main critiques of the
decision was the perceived cost of implementing the broader right to counsel. Like today,
there was widespread concern at the time about the state of the national economy. See, e.g., Is
the U.S. Going Broke?, TIME MAGAZINE, Mar. 13, 1972, at Cover. For a discussion of the
weighing of costs against constitutional rights in another right-to-counsel context, see DeWolfe
v. Richmond, No. 34, 2012 WL 10853, at *14–15 (Md. Jan. 4, 2012).
236
See, e.g., Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2510–11; Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–74; Argersinger, 407
U.S. at 49–50 (Powell, J., concurring); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344; Powell, 287 U.S. at 72–73.
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These two critiques are obviously related, and some scholars have approached the issue as a zero-sum game, arguing that the scarce resources of
the criminal justice system should be spent on improving the quality of defense representation in serious cases.237 While it is almost certainly true that
a broader provision of counsel to those accused of crimes will result in more
guilty people going free, we tolerate that cost because of the value we place
on the procedural protections of the Sixth Amendment and the values that
underlie it.
In fact, available evidence suggests that providing counsel to anyone
accused of a criminal offense would not be prohibitively expensive or difficult to manage. Many states already provide a more robust protection in this
context than the federal constitutional floor established in Gideon,
Argersinger, and Scott.238 State constitutional and statutory provisions for
the appointment of counsel vary, with some states providing counsel for any
indigent person accused of a crime,239 some states providing counsel for any
cases involving actual imprisonment or a fine over a specified amount,240 and
some states encouraging the appointment of counsel in cases not involving
actual incarceration if required by “dictates of fairness and due process.”241
It is difficult to achieve an accurate accounting of the various state ap237
See generally Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 461 (2007). The Argersinger Court directly addressed the issue of cost.
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 44 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Acknowledging the increased expenditures that would certainly accompany an expanded right, Chief Justice Burger wrote: “The
holding of the Court today may well add large new burdens on a profession already overtaxed,
but the dynamics of the profession have a way of rising to the burdens placed on it.” Id.
Justice Brennan’s suggestion that law students have an important contribution to make in the
provision of indigent defense services foretold the current recognition of the need for experiential learning by the legal academy. He wrote:

Law students as well as practicing attorneys may provide an important source of
legal representation for the indigent. . . . Given the huge increase in law school
enrollments over the past few years, I think it plain that law students can be expected
to make a significant contribution, quantitatively and qualitatively, to the representation of the poor in many areas, including cases reached by today’s decision.
Id. at 40–41 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). On the legal academy’s increasing recognition of the importance of experiential education, see generally ROY STUCKEY
ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 165–205 (2007); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET
AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 87–161 (2007).
238
See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 668 (2002) (“Most jurisdictions already provide a state-law right to appointed counsel more generous than that afforded by the Federal
Constitution.”); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 17, at § 11.2(a) nn.28–30B; Mitchell Simpson, III,
A Fair Trial: Are Indigents Charged with Misdemeanors Entitled to Court Appointed Counsel?, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 417, 418–19, 418–19 nn.8–12, 435–38 (2000) (citing
thirty-five states that provide a broader right to counsel than does federal constitutional doctrine and cataloging the conceptual and practical problems with Scott).
239
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; CAL. PENAL CODE § 987 (West 2000);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.10 (McKinney 2010).
240
See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.111.
241
Paul Marcus, Why the United States Supreme Court Got Some (But Not a Lot) of the
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Analysis Right, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 142, 151 (2009)
(summarizing state approaches to the appointment of counsel).
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proaches to the appointment of counsel,242 and actual practice can vary
widely from the laws on the books,243 but it is clear that states have adopted a
variety of approaches to this issue, with some providing the bare minimum
required by the federal constitutional floor and others going well beyond that
standard in appointing counsel in criminal cases.
Of course, lawmakers have another option available to them if the federal constitutional right to counsel is expanded to include all criminal cases:
the transfer of certain kinds of undesirable low-level conduct out of the
criminal context altogether. Far from a novel or radical idea, the idea of
decriminalizing petty forms of misconduct was endorsed by the drafters of
the Model Penal Code in 1962244 and recognized as a possibility by three
Justices of the Supreme Court in their dissenting opinion in Scott:
It may well be that adoption by this Court of an “authorized imprisonment” standard would lead state and local governments to
re-examine their criminal statutes. A state legislature or local government might determine that it no longer desired to authorize incarceration for certain minor offenses in light of the expense of
meeting the requirements of the Constitution. In my view this reexamination is long overdue. In any event, the Court’s “actual
imprisonment” standard must inevitably lead the courts to make
this re-examination, which plainly should more properly be a legislative responsibility.245
An evolution in the scope of the right to counsel to include all criminal cases
would force lawmakers to consider what should constitute a criminal offense. In addition to the growing decriminalization of small amounts of marijuana, jurisdictions would confront the possibility of dealing with other
types of low-level misconduct in a more appropriate, non-criminal way.246

242
In his dissenting opinion in Scott, Justice Brennan listed a majority of states (“at least
33 states” and possibly “closer to 40”) that provided a more generous right to counsel than the
“actual imprisonment” standard adopted by the majority in Scott. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367, 387, 387 n.22 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Commentators have suggested that Brennan’s
count was inaccurate and overstated the extent to which states exceeded the “actual imprisonment” standard. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 17, at § 11.2(a). Whatever the situation at the
time of the decision in Scott, it is clear that some states have restricted their right to courtappointed counsel to conform to the Scott standard since that case was decided.
243
See Roberts, supra note 15, at 312–13 nn.148–50.
244
See Larry Cata Backer, Exposing the Perversions of Toleration: The Decriminalization
of Private Sexual Conduct, the Model Penal Code, and the Oxymoron of Liberal Toleration, 45
FLA. L. REV. 755, 775 (1993).
245
Scott, 440 U.S. at 388–89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
246
See Roberts, supra note 15, at 332–33 (listing marijuana possession, driving on a suspended license, public intoxication, and disorderly conduct as potential candidates for diversion or decriminalization and describing the potentially enormous savings from such a move).
Of course, for the same reasons that it is unrealistic to expect collateral consequences to be
rolled back legislatively, it is difficult to imagine that lawmakers are suddenly going to campaign on promises to decriminalize petty offenses. See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization
Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 719–20 (2005).
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C. Expanding a Broken Right?
Looking at the state of indigent criminal defense representation today
and considering a proposal to expand the right to counsel, one thinks back to
the opening line of Woody Allen’s classic, Annie Hall: “There’s an old joke
— um — two elderly women are at a Catskill mountain resort, and one of
them says, ‘Boy, the food at this place is really terrible.’ The other one says,
‘Yeah, I know, and such small portions.’” 247 To be sure, expanding the right
to counsel does not address the well-documented and troubling dysfunction
that characterizes the state of indigent defense services throughout the
country.248
The mere presence of defense counsel, of course, will not alone solve
the problem. A recurring and enduring problem in both the substantive and
procedural justice offered by misdemeanor courts is the abysmal state of
indigent misdemeanor representation in many parts of the country. A 2009
study by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL)
examined the state of misdemeanor courts generally, with a special focus on
the practice of defense counsel in those courtrooms.249 The report chronicled
overloaded misdemeanor courts and overworked, under-experienced, and
often incompetent defense lawyers who populate them.250 “Site teams witnessed and were told the same things across the country: defenders do not
have enough time to see their clients or to prepare their cases adequately,
there are no witness interviews or investigations, they cannot do the legal
research required or prepare appropriate motions, and their ability to take
cases to trial is compromised.”251 The overwhelming number of cases assigned to public defenders and appointed counsel have been well-documented.252 The problem is particularly concerning, however, in the case of
misdemeanors, where the caseload numbers are even higher and the cases

247
Annie Hall (United Artists Entertainment 1977). Alas, this reference has been used
before in legal scholarship. See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, And Such Small
Portions: Limited Performance Agreements and the Cost/Quality/Access Tradeoff, 11 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 959, 978–79, 978–79 n.96 (1998); Wayne R. LaFave, The Present and Future
Fourth Amendment, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 111, 117 (1995).
248
See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 7–28 (2004),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_
defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf;
AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE 257–66 (2009); Cara Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 428–31 (2009).
249
BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 113, at 30–43.
250
See generally id.
251
Id. at 30–31.
252
See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 248, at 17–18, 38; Heidi Reamer Anderson,
Funding Gideon’s Promise by Viewing Excessive Caseloads as Unethical Conflicts of Interest,
39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421, 425–28 (2012); Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to
Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045–1103 (2006);
Hashimoto, supra note 237, at 468–75; Roberts, supra note 15, at 294–97.

R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\48-1\HLC102.txt

2013]

unknown

Seq: 43

Beyond “Life and Liberty”

1-MAR-13

14:54

43

are handled primarily by less-experienced lawyers.253 The NACDL documents the too-common model of defense lawyering known as “meet ’em and
plead ’em.”254
Nobody observing the current state of indigent defense representation
in the country today could credibly say that the system is functioning well.255
Even in that universe of cases requiring court-appointed counsel, the system
has utterly failed to provide a robust and zealous defense for those accused
of crimes.256 To be sure, the promise of Gideon and the ideal of “equal
justice under law” will not be realized until critical changes are made in the
funding and the culture of indigent criminal defense services.257 But fundamentally, the poor performance of the indigent defense system is a separate
issue from the doctrinal question of the scope of the right to counsel, and
should not be used as a stalking horse to shrink that right. Even if one were
to accept the premise that the current system of appointed counsel does not
provide great benefit to the represented, the answer should be to reform the
system of appointed counsel, not to abandon or shrink it.
Realistically, the provision of counsel in all criminal cases is no panacea for the broader structural, practical, and theoretical problems that attend
the current dual system of mass processing and collateral consequences. By
overlaying increasingly serious indirect consequences on an adjudicative
system that is characterized by informality and efficiency, we continue to
tolerate a system that depends on defendants resolving their cases ignorant
of the long-term effects on their lives or communities. Various approaches
have been proposed to remedy the situation, but the appointment of counsel
to individual defendants, even assuming the most severe limitations, is still
the best way to ensure decisions that are truly voluntary and knowing.
Some have argued that the right to counsel has already been spread too
thin and fails in the misdemeanor context to achieve any substantive goals of
the criminal justice system. Professor Erica Hashimoto has argued that
states should creatively and pragmatically reduce the number of cases in
which counsel must be appointed in order to save the system’s resources for
those cases where counsel is most needed and useful.258 She urges states to
253

See Roberts, supra note 15, at 296.
BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 113, at 31–32 nn.161–63; see also BACH, supra note
248, at 6–7.
255
See generally BACH, supra note 248; Backus & Marcus, supra note 252; AM. BAR
ASS’N, supra note 248.
256
See Brown, supra note 232, at 1413–14; Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical:
Defense Counsel and Collateral Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 678–80
(2011).
257
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 232, at 1411 (“The most effective avenue to remedy
suboptimal defense lawyering is also an unlikely one: reforming indigent defense systems to
bring their resources — and in some cases prosecutor and court resources as well — in line
with the case demands of local criminal dockets.”); Jonathan A. Rapping, You Can’t Build on
Shaky Ground: Laying the Foundation for Indigent Defense Reform Through Values-Based
Recruitment, Training, and Mentoring, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 162–64 (2009).
258
Hashimoto, supra note 237, at 467.
254
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reduce appointment of counsel to the constitutional minimum, to reduce penalties for minor offenses to get them beneath the constitutional threshold for
appointment of counsel, and to require judges and prosecutors to state at the
outset whether or not incarceration is a possibility.259 She argues that, while
this might initially look like a move that would harm criminal defendants,
the empirical evidence shows that appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases
do not typically provide meaningful benefits to defendants.260
This argument, however, focuses exclusively on federal misdemeanors,
a category of cases far afield from the mass of cases that affect people’s
lives.261 Moreover, it fails to account for the advice-giving function of counsel, only measuring results at trial or sentencing. What is absent from the
data studied by Hashimoto is precisely the long-term consequences of a
criminal conviction that remain external to the criminal process itself but
which can be far more devastating than anything imposed by a sentencing
judge: the collateral consequences. Significantly, the Padilla Court focused
on the advice-giving role of defense counsel, rather than on whether counsel
would have contributed to the possibility of a better outcome at trial or sentencing.262 An exclusive focus on trial and sentencing outcomes is misplaced
in a system where trials have become vanishingly rare; over 94% of convictions in state and federal court are obtained after the accused waives her
right to trial and pleads guilty, usually after making an agreement with the
prosecutor.263 Hashimoto’s analysis of the data from federal misdemeanors
does not seem to account for the defendant who, for example, takes the advice of counsel and pleads guilty to an offense different from the offense
charged, which in turn does not result in adverse immigration (or other)
consequences. Creative defense lawyers who are concerned about immigration consequences might very well bargain with prosecutors to allow their

259

Id. at 461.
Id. at 466.
261
Hashimoto recognizes this limitation on her data, acknowledging that “[b]ecause the
vast majority of misdemeanor defendants are prosecuted in state courts, this gap in data is
significant.” Id. at 494.
262
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010). By contrast, the Argersinger Court
focused on the disparate results the represented and unrepresented misdemeanants achieved,
citing evidence that “[m]isdemeanants represented by attorneys are five times as likely to
emerge from police court with all charges dismissed as are defendants who face similar
charges without counsel.” Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972) (internal citations
omitted).
263
SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN
STATE COURTS 25 tbl.4.1 (2009). In federal court, the most recent data available show that
97.4% of cases are now resolved by plea. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1 tbl.5.22.2010 (2010), available at http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.10 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/
Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2010/Table10.pdf, cited in Love, supra note 119, 89 n.4.
260
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client to spend extra time in jail in exchange for a reduction of the offense to
one without immigration consequences.264
There is reason to believe, in fact, that defense counsel have much more
latitude and success in avoiding collateral consequences in the context of
misdemeanors. Professor Darryl Brown has argued that the Padilla decision
may not have the dramatic impact that some have predicted because it
neither changes the substantive law that imposes collateral consequences,
like deportation, nor improves the low level of defense representation that is
endemic, especially in state courts.265 In misdemeanor cases, however, effective defense counsel may actually be able to engage in the sort of charge
bargaining and plea negotiation that the Padilla Court suggested and to arrange for a creative disposition that will not result in a collateral
consequence.266
It is correct, of course, that an expansion of the constitutional right to
counsel would require some additional expenditure of resources. But the
logic of the Gideon-Argersinger line of cases applied to a modern context
requires this expansion of the right. The Supreme Court, which has recently
shown a willingness to resist cost-based arguments against broad recognition
of other trial rights,267 seems to be coming close to recognizing it. In Padilla, the Court explicitly recognized the importance of counsel in correctly
explaining and advising defendants on certain collateral consequences.268 If
counsel is constitutionally required to explain to Padilla the immigration
consequences of a criminal conviction for trafficking in marijuana, then certainly defense counsel should have the same obligation to explain to a defendant facing a misdemeanor drug possession the very same immigration
consequences that would result from that conviction.269
The right to counsel has both substantive and procedural value, and it
exists not only to ensure reliable results but also to guarantee fair processes

264

See, e.g., DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS P’SHIP, REPRESENTING NONCITIZEN CRIMINAL DEA NATIONAL GUIDE 70–71 (2008); IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, A DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS PRACTICE ADVISORY: DUTY OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE COUNSEL REPRESENTING AN
IMMIGRANT DEFENDANT AFTER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 6 (2010), available at http://txe.fd.org/
PDF%20files/PadillaPracticeAdvisory.pdf.
265
Brown, supra note 232, at 1395.
266
See id. at 1411 n.73 (“[S]ome indigent defense organizations not only provide quality
representation generally but have been effective . . . at developing expertise to improve outcomes for clients (especially those facing misdemeanor charges) by negotiating in light of the
range of collateral consequences that follow criminal convictions . . . .”). In more serious
cases, prosecutors would of course be less willing to engage in the kind of charge bargaining
that could avoid potential collateral consequences.
267
See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 325 (2009); Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004).
268
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1476 (2010).
269
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2011) (“Any alien who at any time after admission has
been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation . . . relating to a controlled substance
. . . other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of
marijuana, is deportable.”).

FENDANTS:
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for arriving at those results.270 Those who call into question the true value of
counsel to a misdemeanor defendant may well underestimate the value to a
defendant of a well-informed advocate available to discuss her options and
to make sure that the formal procedural safeguards in place to protect the
accused actually function as intended.
Others have also suggested, in the face of practical limitations, a triagebased approach to the right to counsel. Darryl Brown has argued that public
defenders and court-appointed lawyers should selectively ration their services, resources, and energy, focusing on those defendants “facing greater
potential punishments.”271 Such proposals, however, fail to take account adequately of the many purposes a lawyer serves short of trial and the many
indirect punishments visited upon a convicted person beyond those imposed
by the sentencing judge. A person accused of a seemingly petty crime, without advice of counsel, would have no reason to suspect that a guilty plea
with a suspended sentence would also subject her to deportation, eviction,
and any number of externally imposed consequences. One role of the lawyer in such a situation should be to ensure that the accused is properly advised of the entirety of the consequences that would attend a conviction.
The interplay between an informal and procedurally loose system of
low-level criminal adjudication and the current far-reaching and harsh system of collateral consequences creates a troubling overall regime in which
people can unknowingly surrender important rights and entitlements. One
way of resolving this dilemma would be to regulate and rein in the system of
collateral consequences. Some have argued that, because the current system
disenfranchises and disempowers ex-offenders, and is therefore at odds with
national policy, many such collateral consequences should be eliminated.272
Although a reduction in the breadth and severity of collateral consequences
would certainly be a welcome development, such a solution is hindered by
270
For a discussion of the “conceptual tension” between a substantive and a procedural
understanding of the right to counsel, see TOMKOVICZ, supra note 27, at xxiv (According to
one understanding of the right to counsel, that right is “both a vital guarantee of fair results
and an essential component of fair processes. This perspective maintains that excessive emphasis on the substantive contributions that defense lawyers make to the outcome of proceedings is misguided and fails to account for the essential role that counsel plays in ensuring that
those outcomes are achieved by means of fair procedures.”).
271
Darryl Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 801 (2004); see also Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 911, 914–15 (2005); John Mitchell, In
(Slightly Uncomfortable) Defense of “Triage” by Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 925,
933 (2005); John Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215,
1271–76 (1994); Roberts, supra note 15, at 346–48.
272
Nora Demleitner argues:
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All collateral sanctions that hinder an offender’s political participation or exclude her
from other crucial functions of the modern state should be eliminated. These sanctions merely serve to set offenders continually apart without providing a tangible
benefit. Therefore, they hamper the reintegration of offenders into society, a goal
Congress and the President have declared to be crucial.
Demleitner, supra note 206, at 358–59 (internal citations omitted).
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the multitude of sources from which these consequences flow; some arise
from federal law, but many others are creatures of state law, agency regulation, or the purely private discretion of other actors, including employers.273
Because of the broad scope of collateral consequences and their disparate
sources, it is virtually impossible for an accused individual to ascertain all of
the potential collateral consequences of a particular conviction.274 The same
factors make the web of collateral consequences a particularly vexing target
for reform.
Many have called for state and federal lawmakers to reduce voluntarily
the number and severity of collateral consequences;275 in 2011, United States
Attorney General Eric Holder called on state attorneys general to review
state laws and regulations that impose such consequences on those convicted
of crimes, and to repeal those that impose an undue burden on people convicted of crimes without enhancing public safety.276 Attorney General
Holder, however, is no more able to force this change than academics and
others who have previously called for the rollback of collateral consequences. The proliferation (and potential repeal) of collateral consequences
is a political decision ultimately controlled by politicians who have little
incentive to champion the rights of convicted criminals.277
Ultimately, then, because of the difficulty in curtailing the sprawl and
scope of collateral consequences, courts should address the problem differently and provide counsel to anyone accused of a crime that could lead to
such a consequence. Realistically, due to the reach and variety of serious
collateral consequences, this would require an expansion of the right to appointed counsel to anyone charged with a crime.
Throughout the middle of the twentieth century, the American right to
counsel similarly evolved to better address the realities of criminal adjudica-

273
In the employment context, the combination of widely available online background
checks and habitual unwillingness on the part of employers to hire anyone with a criminal
history can be extremely difficult to overcome. Indeed, with regard to private hiring practices,
the private exercise of preference falls largely outside the reach of government to change, even
if lawmakers were so inclined. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS THAT ENCOURAGE THE EMPLOYMENT OF QUALIFIED PEOPLE [WITH] CRIMINAL HISTORIES 1 (2005),
available at http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/employmentstdssumary.pdf. Some states, however, have passed legislation to limit discrimination on the basis of certain prior criminal convictions. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5(a)-(d) (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 224710(f) (West 2012); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 750–54 (2007); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9124–25
(2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.335 (West 2012).
274
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (2010); Demleitner, supra note 142, at
154 (“The number and scope of such adverse consequences tend to be unknown even to the
participants in the criminal justice system, often because they are scattered throughout different bodies of law.”).
275
AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 201, at 9.
276
See Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 195.
277
See Luna, supra note 246, at 719 (“Conventional wisdom suggests that appearing
tough on crime wins elections regardless of the underlying justification . . . while it is difficult
to recall a single modern politician who came into office on a platform of decriminalization or
punishment reduction.”).
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tion.278 Today, the right to counsel can and should continue to evolve. This
evolution should reflect the changing circumstances under which prosecutions occur and the dramatically more severe penalties that now occur as an
indirect result of the criminal process.
CONCLUSION
For the more than 50 million Americans with misdemeanor convictions
on their records, the world is a very different place today than it was thirty
years ago. The Supreme Court froze the development of the federal constitutional right to counsel at a particularly inopportune moment in history. At
the time of Scott v. Illinois, it would have been difficult to conceive of a
misdemeanor conviction — certainly one that did not involve incarceration
— resulting in the deportation, eviction, or lifetime registration in an online
database for the defendant. In such a context, using incarceration to draw a
bright line between serious and petty offenses may have made some sense.
Today, however, even the lowest-level criminal misdemeanor can lead directly and irreversibly to one of these or many other collateral consequences.
A system that makes it relatively painless to plead guilty (which has
always been true for low-level offenses) has been overlaid with a new system of increasingly harsh collateral consequences. Without counsel to advise the accused of the longer-term, hidden, collateral consequences of a
conviction, the decisional calculus is skewed and the choice to enter a quick
guilty plea is easy, painless, and often uninformed and misguided.279 By
focusing on informality, efficiency, and the mass processing of cases, players in the criminal justice system (judges, defense counsel, and prosecutors)
“deny the offender the dignity of free choice by keeping him ignorant of the
full consequences for his life course of, for example, his pleading guilty.”280
Moreover, the change in policing and prosecution philosophy that has
occurred since the early 1980s has led to millions more people becoming
ensnared in the misdemeanor criminal justice system. Calls to roll back and
eliminate the system of collateral consequences have failed to yield results.
Because of the externally imposed and multi-sourced nature of collateral
consequences, courts have few options to control their spread. What courts
can and should do, though, is recognize the changed context in which misdemeanors take place today and revisit the petty-serious dichotomy set forth in
Scott. The use of incarceration as the sine qua non of seriousness no longer
reflects the realities of the criminal justice system.
Throughout its history, the right to counsel has evolved to meet the
changing times and circumstances of the criminal justice system. Although
the evolution of the right to counsel has been gradual and halting, the Su278

See supra Part I.C.
Roberts, supra note 15, at 307–08.
280
Taslitz, supra note 197, at 515.
279

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\48-1\HLC102.txt

2013]

unknown

Seq: 49

Beyond “Life and Liberty”

1-MAR-13

14:54

49

preme Court has from time to time aligned the right to better reflect the
realities of criminal adjudication. Powell took note of the realities of the
criminal adjudication system in the 1930s South and facilitated an evolution
in Sixth Amendment doctrine to require the appointment of counsel at least
in the most serious cases and in circumstances in which the defendant was
unable to mount her own defense.281 This jurisprudence in turn gave rise to
the historic decisions in Gideon and then Argersinger, in which the Court
recognized that criminal prosecutions in the 1960s and 1970s were carried
out by the “machinery” of the state and that the right to counsel needed to
evolve to accommodate the reality of the professional prosecutor.282 Taking
stock of the changed context of criminal prosecutions, the Court recognized
the need for court-appointed counsel in all serious cases.283 In Gideon, Justice Harlan looked back to the Court’s previous rule that court-appointed
counsel was required only when “special circumstances” made it necessary.284 While such a fact-specific rule might have made sense in past eras,
reasoned Justice Harlan, the changed modern context rendered it obsolete:
“The Court has come to recognize, in other words, that the mere existence of
a serious criminal charge constituted in itself special circumstances requiring
the services of counsel at trial.”285
Fifty years later, because of the widespread collateral consequences that
have become an inexorable corollary to even low-level convictions, any
criminal prosecution now presents the “special circumstances” to which Justice Harlan referred. The Padilla Court expressly noted the changed context
in which criminal prosecutions take place today, and the necessary next step
is for the Court once again to align the right to counsel with modern realities
by extending it to all criminal cases.

281

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 52–60 (1932).
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
283
See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45.
284
See id. at 349–52 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
285
Id. at 351.
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